Free Will Is Un-natural
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Much current research in social psychology has demonstrated unconscious impulses or guides to situationally appropriate behavior. These come from immediate and automatic evaluative, motivational, and perceptual mental processes. These in turn come from evolution, from culture, and from imitative and vicarious early learning; in children as well as adults they provide behavioral suggestions or impulses that we commonly act on though we do not intend or are aware of those influences. It is concluded from this research that we do not need the philosophical concept of free will to explain the origin of our own action, and to insert the concept of free agency is contrary to a natural science understanding of human action.
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Cites
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Cited by
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
(2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001 · Cited by 332
Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution
Shariff, A. F., Greene, J. D., Karremans, J. C., Luguri, J. B., Clark, C. J., Schooler, J. W., Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797614534693 · Cited by 311
The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility
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Control: conscious and otherwise
Suhler, C. L., & Churchland, P. S. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.010 · Cited by 138
Metadata
- Authors
- Bargh, J. A.
- Venue
- Are We Free?
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2008-03-20
- Pages
- 128-154
- OpenAlex
- W2183125793
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 17.53
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.