The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good
Abstract
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. Part One of this book presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. The other two parts address two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence has indeed a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Part Three of the book explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavour, and education. It argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgement of sufficient ‘moral luck’ in the development of any individual's character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
"From Jerusalem to Jericho": A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior.
Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0034449 · Cited by 1,665
Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics
Doris, J. M. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00136 · Cited by 731
Badhwar, N. K. (1996) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2216272 · Cited by 238
Cited by
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Russell, D. C. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001 · Cited by 582
Alfano, M. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139208536 · Cited by 356
Moral Character: An Empirical Theory
Miller, C. B. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674350.001.0001 · Cited by 276
Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
Integrity in Professional Life: Issues of Conduct, Commitment and Capacity
Banks, S. (2010) · British Journal of Social Work · doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcp152 · Cited by 86
Metadata
- Authors
- Adams, R. M.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2006-10-05
- OpenAlex
- W1596390162
- Cited by
- 341
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 29.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.001.0001
- The paper
- Adams, R. M. (2006). A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199207510.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.