Cited by 356Philosophical Ethics and TheoryValues and Moral EducationEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Character as Moral Fiction

Open access
Alfano, Mark·2013·Cambridge University Press eBooks

Abstract

Everyone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies - children become more studious if they are told that they are hard-working and adults become more generous if they are told that they are generous. He argues that we should think of virtue and character as social constructs: there is no such thing as virtue without social reinforcement. His original and provocative book will interest a wide range of readers in contemporary ethics, epistemology, moral psychology and empirically informed philosophy.

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Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139208536

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31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Self-fulfilling prophecies tend to occur only when targets are able to change in accordance with the trait ascriptions, when the ascriptions are believable rather than unrealistic, and when the ascriber holds more power than the ascribee.

    “For instance, they tend to occur only when targets are able to change in accordance with the trait ascriptions, when the latter are believable rather than unrealistic (Alfano 2013: 91f), and when the ascriber holds more power than the ascribee (Copeland 1994: 264f).”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Alfano 2013

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Authors
Alfano, M.
Affiliations
University of Notre Dame (US)
Corresponding author
Alfano, Mark
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
2013-02-05
OpenAlex
W9204587
Cited by
356
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 50 · 2019: 65 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 10
FWCI
25.03
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • Research Bank (Australian Catholic University) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • University of Notre Dame
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Education › Values and Moral Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
character, virtue, moral fiction, self-fulfilling prophecy, moral psychology, virtue ethics, social reinforcement, character development

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