The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How many dual-process theories do we need? One, two, or many?
Abstract
Dual-process theories of cognition are to be found everywhere in psychology. This chapter addresses whether there is a need to have this great multiplicity of theories, or whether there is one grand unifying dual-process theory that can incorporate them all. It argues that such theories fall into two distinct groups from the viewpoint of the cognitive architecture they imply. There is also a third notion (cognitive styles) that can all too readily be confused with such two-process accounts. A minimal definition of the difference is that type 1 processes are fast, automatic, low effort, and have a high processing capacity; and that type 2 processes are slow, controlled, high effort, and have a high processing capacity.
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Cites
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Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
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Self-citationCulture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition.
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Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Self-citationIntuition, reason, and metacognition
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 · Cited by 703
Nonconscious processes and health.
Sheeran, P., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2013) · Health Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0029203 · Cited by 579
Associative processes in intuitive judgment
Morewedge, C. K., & Kahneman, D. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.004 · Cited by 492
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Venue
- In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-29
- Pages
- 33-54
- OpenAlex
- W2504271542
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 46.31
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.