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Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Abstract
In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains.
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In the citing paper
“epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest.”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Zagzebski, 2012
In the citing paper
“Expertise may involve a more distant or impersonal relationship, while authority requires a closer one.”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Zagzebski, 2012
In the citing paper
“as some philosophers have argued, self-trust in one's own capacities, together with the conscientious employment of these capacities, is an essential precondition for having justified beliefs and knowledge in the first place (Zagzebski, 2012 ; Dormandy, 2020 ).”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Zagzebski, 2012
In the citing paper
“The foundational insight of this literature is that trust must be dynamically calibrated against a source's reliability, the stakes of the claim and the availability of independent verification.”
From Beyond prompt literacy: Towards a critical epistemological framework for artificial intelligence literacy in higher education (2026) · cites this paper as Zagzebski 2012
In the citing paper
“The second is that self-trust is nevertheless defeasible.”
From Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice (2023) · cites this paper as Zagzebski 2012
In the citing paper
“There is nothing epistemically problematic in preferring the deliverances of someone else ' s cognitive faculties over one ' s own on particular topics or in well-circumscribed areas (Zagzebski 2012, Ch. 1).”
From Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice (2023) · cites this paper as Zagzebski 2012
In the citing paper
“The fi rst is that it is default rational to have self-trust concerning one ' s own cognitive faculties and judgments.”
From Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice (2023) · cites this paper as Zagzebski 2012
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Items 301–400 of 489
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Smith, S. G. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108580441.012
Smith, S. G. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108580441.009
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zagzebski, L. T.
- Corresponding author
- Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2012-11-07
- OpenAlex
- W4210369994
- Cited by
- 489
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 78 · 2025: 117 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 36 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6
- FWCI
- 14.16
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic authority, epistemic autonomy, self-reflection, Joseph Raz, epistemic trust, epistemic rationality
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