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Cited by 489Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsFeminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus·2012·Oxford University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001
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Abstract

In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains.

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Metadata

Authors
Zagzebski, L. T.
Corresponding author
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus
ORCID
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2012-11-07
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4210369994
Cited by
489
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 78 · 2025: 117 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 36 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6
FWCI
14.16
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
epistemic authority, epistemic autonomy, self-reflection, Joseph Raz, epistemic trust, epistemic rationality

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