The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal (Balog 2000b; Byrne 1997; Kriegel 2003; Levine 2001; Mandik 2009; Neander 1998; Rey 2000; Van Gulick 2000, 2004; Weisberg 2010). Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a ‘retreat’ (2005b: 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem. The fatal objection is short and simple, but some ground-clearing is required in order to state it. There are two quite different approaches to the nature of consciousness. One line of thought (that I have favoured) emphasizes the notoriously elusive ‘what it is like’ (Nagel 1974) to have an experience (Block 1978; Chalmers 1996; Levine 1983; McGinn 1989). Higher order theorists often use the phrase ‘what it is like’, supposing, controversially, that their theories are able to account for what-it-is-like-ness, and I will contest that claim, taking advantage of that common terminology.
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“A similar point applies to the fact that in the higher order account it has to be stipulated that the higher order representation occurs at the same time (or at least overlaps in time) and in the same mind as the first order representation it represents (Block 2005a, 2009, Van Gulick 2004).”
Self-citation(2007) · Consciousness, Function, and Representation · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0006 · Cited by 603
Self-citation
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A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory
Marchesi, A. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01726-w
“…by some scholars (see Neander, 1998; Levine, 2001; Kriegel, 2003) and over the years has been cited by other scholars as a strong motivation for abandoning higher-order theories in favor of alternative views (see, e.g., Brook & Raymont, 2006; Horgan et al., 2006; Kriegel, 2009b; Block, 2011).”
BackgroundHigher-Order Awareness of What?
MacRae, C. Z. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00443-4
“12 The classic contributions are: Neander (1998); Levine (2001); Kriegel (2009); Block (2011); Rosenthal (2011); Weisberg (2011a).”
BackgroundConsciousness, Representation, and Flexibility
Languedoc, W. (2020) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2020-14045
Samier, H. (2018) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119482932.refs
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Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, N.
- ORCID
- Block, N.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-18
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-431
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2072306674
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 9.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- theory of consciousness, what it is like, phenomenal experience, David Rosenthal, nature of consciousness
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