The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal (Balog 2000b; Byrne 1997; Kriegel 2003; Levine 2001; Mandik 2009; Neander 1998; Rey 2000; Van Gulick 2000, 2004; Weisberg 2010). Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a ‘retreat’ (2005b: 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem. The fatal objection is short and simple, but some ground-clearing is required in order to state it. There are two quite different approaches to the nature of consciousness. One line of thought (that I have favoured) emphasizes the notoriously elusive ‘what it is like’ (Nagel 1974) to have an experience (Block 1978; Chalmers 1996; Levine 1983; McGinn 1989). Higher order theorists often use the phrase ‘what it is like’, supposing, controversially, that their theories are able to account for what-it-is-like-ness, and I will contest that claim, taking advantage of that common terminology.
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Cites
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Cited by
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
“A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents (121).”
BackgroundUnderstanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 · Cited by 573
“This is related to another common criticism of HOT concerning possiblemismatches between higherorder and first-order contents [27].”
BackgroundThe Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Self-citationUnconscious Perception Reconsidered
Phillips, I. (2018) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12135 · Cited by 163
“To block the Burgean concern that mere sensory information would not constitute perception proper, I focus on a study by Norman et al. (2014) which aims to establish constancy-implicating priming effects—and thus genuinely objective representation—at the objective threshold.”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, N.
- ORCID
- Block, N.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-18
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-431
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2072306674
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 9.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- theory of consciousness, what it is like, phenomenal experience, David Rosenthal, nature of consciousness
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