The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal (Balog 2000b; Byrne 1997; Kriegel 2003; Levine 2001; Mandik 2009; Neander 1998; Rey 2000; Van Gulick 2000, 2004; Weisberg 2010). Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a ‘retreat’ (2005b: 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem. The fatal objection is short and simple, but some ground-clearing is required in order to state it. There are two quite different approaches to the nature of consciousness. One line of thought (that I have favoured) emphasizes the notoriously elusive ‘what it is like’ (Nagel 1974) to have an experience (Block 1978; Chalmers 1996; Levine 1983; McGinn 1989). Higher order theorists often use the phrase ‘what it is like’, supposing, controversially, that their theories are able to account for what-it-is-like-ness, and I will contest that claim, taking advantage of that common terminology.
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“A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents (121).”
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“, Block (2011). [3] For a careful defense of this precise formulation of the view, see Berger (forthcoming). [4] See Rosenthal (2005, pp. 218–219, 303–305). [5] Unlike Gennaro, Rosenthal draws a distinction between sensory and perceptual states. On his view, both types of state have representational properties, but of…”
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“Voir Block, 2011, Neander, 1998, Rosenthal, 2011 et Weisberg, 2011. certaine sensation S même si ce contenu est faux parce que je ne suis dans aucun état sensoriel, auquel cas ce contenu serait faux parce qu’il est vide.”
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“For their comments and suggestions I would like to thank also to Ned Block, Maite Ezcurdia, Manolo Martínez, Josh Weisberg and two anonymous referees.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, N.
- ORCID
- Block, N.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-18
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-431
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2072306674
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 9.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- theory of consciousness, what it is like, phenomenal experience, David Rosenthal, nature of consciousness
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.