Exaggerated reports: reply to Block
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The report of my death is an exaggeration. (Mark Twain, New York Journal, 2 June 1897) A state’s being conscious is a matter of mental appearance – of how one’s mental life appears to one. If somebody is in a mental state but doesn’t seem subjectively to be in that state, the state is not conscious. This straightforward test for the consciousness of mental states is deeply entrenched in common sense and experimental work in psychology. Higher-order theories exploit this, arguing that a state is conscious only if one is subjectively aware of oneself as being in that state. The higher-order-thought (HOT) theory explains that subjective awareness as due to one’s having a thought that one is in the state. And to explain why our awareness of our conscious states seems subjectively unmediated, that HOT must seem subjectively to be independent of inference and observation. Ned Block1 sees the theory as harbouring an incoherence. The alleged incoherence builds on the much discussed2 possibility of one’s having a HOT without actually being in the state the HOT represents one as being in. Concern about this possibility may seem especially pressing when the state the HOT represents one as being in is qualitative. I’ve argued (e.g. 2005: 217–18) that in such a case one will still be subjectively aware of oneself as being in whatever state the HOT describes one as being in. Such cases are presumably rare; but we can test for them, since the causal role of a HOT will differ to some extent from that of the first-order state it’s about.
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Citations
Cites
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Two neural correlates of consciousness
Block, N. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 · Cited by 713
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Byrne, A., & Levine, J. (2002) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/1556435 · Cited by 266
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144 · cited 3×
“There is nothing startling or incoherent about this.4 Block sees the HOT theory as holding that a HOT at a particular time ‘is sufficient for the occurrence of a conscious episode at’ that time (Block 2011: 424).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness
Neander, K. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18 · Cited by 124
Cited by
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
Self-citationThe Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Raccah, O., Block, N., & Fox, K. C. R. (2021) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1141-20.2020 · Cited by 96
The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Brown, R. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0388-7 · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-16
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 431-437
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2077082288
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 5.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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