The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis
Abstract
In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the mind which I call the Library Model of Cognition. Second, I argue that this alternative model is compatible with the central theoretical and methodological commitments of evolutionary psychology. Thus I argue that, at present, the endorsement of the Massive Modularity Hypothesis by evolutionary psychologists is both unwarranted and unmotivated.
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Cites
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From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure
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“The experimental data shows that adolescents and adults with autism, even with IQs within normal range, have considerable difficulty passing false belief tasks—tasks that are routinely passed by normal 4-year-old subjects (Leslie and Frith [1988]).”
BackgroundOrigins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization
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Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012 · Cited by 1,569
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.
Barrett, H. C., & Kurzban, R. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.628 · Cited by 785
Developmental Dynamics: Toward a Biologically Plausible Evolutionary Psychology.
Lickliter, R., & Honeycutt, H. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.6.819 · Cited by 323
How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism
WEINBERG, J. M. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00157.x · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Samuels, R.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-12-01
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 575-602
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2339585436
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 8.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.