The role of motor intention in motor awareness: an experimental study on anosognosia for hemiplegia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent theories propose that anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) results from specific impairments in motor planning. However, no study has hitherto directly investigated the role of motor intention in the observed non-veridical awareness of action in AHP. We developed the following paradigm to investigate the role of motor planning in awareness in patients with AHP: Four hemiplegic patients with and four without anosognosia were provided with false visual feedback of movement in their left paralysed arm through a prosthetic rubber hand. We examined whether the ability to detect presence or absence of movement based on visual evidence varied according to whether the patient had planned to move their limb or not. Motor intention had a selective effect on patients with AHP; they were more likely than controls (U = 16, P < 0.001) to ignore the visual feedback of a motionless hand and claim that they moved it when they had the intention to do so (self-generated movement) than when they expected an experimenter to move their own hand (externally generated movement), or there was no expectation of movement. By contrast, patients without AHP were not influenced by these manipulations, and did not claim they moved their hand when the hand remained still. This is the first direct demonstration that altered awareness of action in AHP reflects a dominance of motor intention prior to action over sensory information about the actual effects of movement.
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Citations
Cites
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410 · cited 1×
“The attribution of ownership of the rubber hand points to the fragility of our ownership judgements and is relevant to studies of the ‘rubber-hand illusion’ in healthy volunteers (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).”
BackgroundDelis-Kaplan Executive Function System
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“Wechsler (2001); Wechsler (1998); Visual-fields= the customary ‘confrontation’ technique (Bisiach et al.”
MethodThe rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference frame for body ownership.
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“All patients (including the patient with a somatoparaphrenic delusion) denied ownership of the rubber hand in all incongruent positions, replicating previous findings in healthy participants (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007).”
ResultSelf-citationShared cortical anatomy for motor awareness and motor control
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“The effects of illusory visual feedback on action recognition have been similarly explored using mirrors (Ramachandran, 1995) and video projections (Daprati et al., 1997; Sirigu et al., 1999).”
Cited by
My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership.
Tsakiris, M. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034 · Cited by 1,069
Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation in humans
Desmurget, M., Reilly, K. T., Richard, N., Szathmari, A., Mottolese, C., & Sirigu, A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1169896 · Cited by 695
What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter?
Moore, J. W. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 · Cited by 645
Embodiment, ownership and disownership
de Vignemont, F. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004 · Cited by 484
Modulating the sense of agency with external cues
Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004 · Cited by 408
Self-citationA parietal-premotor network for movement intention and motor awareness
Desmurget, M., & Sirigu, A. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.001 · Cited by 370
The Experience of Agency: Feelings, Judgments, and Responsibility
Haggard, P., & Tsakiris, M. (2009) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01644.x · Cited by 367
Self-citationHaving a body versus moving your body: Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership
Tsakiris, M., Longo, M. R., & Haggard, P. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.021 · Cited by 358
Self-citationHuman Metacognition Across Domains: Insights from Individual Differences and Neuroimaging
Rouault, M., McWilliams, A., Allen, M. G., & Fleming, S. M. (2018) · Personality Neuroscience · doi:10.1017/pen.2018.16 · Cited by 176
Tian, X., & Poeppel, D. (2012) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00314 · Cited by 161
“We hypothesize that the apparent awareness and control of a lost limb occurs as follows: the missing somatosensory feedback is “replaced” by the results of internal estimation (cf. Frith et al., 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2008).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fotopoulou, A., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Vagopoulou, A., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, M.
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-09-23
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3432-3442
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W1972984619
- Cited by
- 126
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 5.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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