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When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders

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Bakke, Kristin M, Mitchell, Neil J, Smidt, Hannah M · 2020 · International Studies Quarterly
Cited by 77

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Research suggests that civil society mobilization together with the ratification of human rights treaties put pressure on governments to improve their human rights practices. An unexplored theoretical implication is that pressure provokes counterpressure. Instead of improving treaty compliance, some governments will have an interest in demobilizing civil society to silence their critics. Yet we do not know how and to what extent this incentive shapes governments’ policies and practices regarding civil society organizations. In this article we argue and show—using a new global database of government-sponsored restrictions on civil society organizations—that when governments have committed to human rights treaties and, at the same time, continue to commit severe human rights abuses, they impose restrictions on civil society groups to avoid monitoring and mitigate the international costs of abuses.

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Research works printed but not linked: 50

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Bakke, K. M., Mitchell, N. J., & Smidt, H. M.
Venue
International Studies Quarterly
Published
2019-12-17
Volume
64
Issue
1
Pages
85-96
ISSN
  • 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2478
OpenAlex
W2994728233
Cited by
77
References
4
FWCI
16.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Funders
British Academy (SG152265)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/isq/sqz088
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Bakke, K. M., Mitchell, N. J., & Smidt, H. M. (2020). When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders. International Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz088

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