The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Abstract
John Ferejohn, Charles Shipan; Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 6, Issue special_issue, 1 Ja
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Citations
Cites
Incumbent performance and electoral control
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Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Vanberg, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510427 · Cited by 528
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Koppell, J. G. (2005) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x · Cited by 495
Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?
Bonica, A., McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.3.103 · Cited by 488
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1994) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111603 · Cited by 447
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
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Promarket Reforms and Firm profitability in Developing Countries
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Dau, L. A. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.47085192 · Cited by 418
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Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.44.2.325 · Cited by 390
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Moe, T. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.132 · Cited by 348
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress
Groseclose, T., Levitt, S. D., & Snyder, J. M. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585759 · Cited by 343
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(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0578 · Cited by 323
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
Clark, T. S. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x · Cited by 320
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Huber, J. D., Shipan, C. R., & Pfahler, M. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669344 · Cited by 285
Self-citationRegimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective
Helmke, G., & Rosenbluth, F. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521 · Cited by 283
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556079 · Cited by 274
Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina
Helmke, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510144 · Cited by 266
Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory
Moe, T. M., & Howell, W. G. (1999) · Presidential Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1741-5705.00070 · Cited by 224
Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
Moser, P. (1999) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00045-2 · Cited by 173
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ferejohn, J., & Shipan, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1990-01-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- special
- Pages
- 1-20
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2726368154
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 34.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.