The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements
Abstract
While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submit that they substitute for or “crowd out” social norms supporting informal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to test these theories by manipulating the extent to which individuals transact repeatedly and the level of contract costs. We find that, by enforcing contractible exchange dimensions, contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible dimensions. This complementarity effect is particularly important when repetition is unlikely and thus self-enforcement is difficult. Although our data suggest the existence of reciprocity as an alternative, informal enforcement mechanism, we do not find evidence that contracts substitute for this social norm.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic ‘Remedies’ for Trust/Distrust
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.4.3.367 · Cited by 1,545
More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust and crowding
Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000211 · Cited by 391
Cited by
Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 960
The Effects of Business and Political Ties on Firm Performance: Evidence from China
Sheng, S., Zhou, K. Z., & Li, J. J. (2011) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.75.1.1 · Cited by 942
Interorganizational Trust, Governance Choice, and Exchange Performance
Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0345 · Cited by 621
Handbook of Management Accounting Research
(2009) · Handbooks of Management Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/s1751-3243(07)x0001-4 · Cited by 508
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
Malhotra, D., & Lumineau, F. (2011) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.0683 · Cited by 492
Metadata
- Authors
- Lazzarini, S. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-10-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 261-298
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124103699
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 23.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lazzarini, S. G. (2004). Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewh034
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