The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances
Open accessAbstract
Transaction cost economics argues that aligning transactions with governance structures leads to more efficient outcomes. While empirical evidence demonstrates that firms choose governance consistent with transaction cost predictions, the performance implications of governance choices are less well explored. Here, I examine the cost of misaligned governance in the context of R&D alliances. Two costs of misalignment are evaluated: excessive contracting hazards and excessive bureaucracy. Using a sample of R&D alliances in the telecom equipment industry, I find that alliance governance selected according to transaction cost arguments improves collaborative benefits substantially over governance not so selected. Interestingly, governance alignments imposing excessive bureaucracy reduce collaborative benefits more than misalignments imposing excessive contracting hazards do. These results provide empirical evidence of the cost of misaligned governance and have implications for research on the limits of internal organization and that linking organizational form and innovation. Keywords: governance, alliances, R&D, patents
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393553 · Cited by 35,728
The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects
ROSENBAUM, P. R., & RUBIN, D. B. (1983) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/70.1.41 · Cited by 31,241
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Williamson, O. E. (1991) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393356 · Cited by 7,151
Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey
Griliches, Z. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3301 · Cited by 5,828
DOES FAMILIARITY BREED TRUST? THE IMPLICATIONS OF REPEATED TIES FOR CONTRACTUAL CHOICE IN ALLIANCES.
Gulati, R. (1995) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256729 · Cited by 4,991
(1967) · Project Euclid (Cornell University) · Cited by 4,720
The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools
Hall, B., Jaffe, A., & Trajtenberg, M. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8498 · Cited by 3,507
Neither market nor hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization
Milošević, D. (2014) · Cited by 3,447
Strategic alliances and interfirm knowledge transfer
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171108 · Cited by 3,426
Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship
Hausman, J., Hall, B. H., & Griliches, Z. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911191 · Cited by 3,393
The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983) · Biometrika · doi:10.2307/2335942 · Cited by 3,261
A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations
Trajtenberg, M. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555502 · Cited by 2,956
Jaffe, A. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1815 · Cited by 2,808
Econometric models based on count data. Comparisons and applications of some estimators and tests
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (1986) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.3950010104 · Cited by 1,771
Jaffe, A. B. (1986) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,699
Holmstrom, B. (1989) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90025-5 · Cited by 1,648
The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis
Pisano, G. P. (1990) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393554 · Cited by 1,434
Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study
Ginarte, J. C., & Park, W. G. (1997) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(97)00022-x · Cited by 1,345
Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models
Murphy, K. M., & Topel, R. H. (2002) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/073500102753410417 · Cited by 1,322
Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm
Liebeskind, J. P. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171109 · Cited by 1,291
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118360 · Cited by 1,201
Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach
Oxley, J. E. (1997) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023389 · Cited by 1,089
Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look
Hall, B., Jaffe, A., & Trajtenberg, M. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7741 · Cited by 1,082
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment
(1995) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036875 · Cited by 987
Patel, P., & Pavitt, K. (1997) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(97)00005-x · Cited by 919
Oxley, J. E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00011-6 · Cited by 746
Does Diversification Cause the 'Diversification Discount'?
Villalonga, B. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.227828 · Cited by 737
Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-Experimental Causal Studies
Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1084955 · Cited by 735
Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry
(1989) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036960 · Cited by 609
(1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037001 · Cited by 593
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T. (2000) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00114 · Cited by 545
Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models
Murphy, K. M., & Topel, R. H. (1985) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.1985.10509471 · Cited by 495
Tobin's q and the Importance of Focus in Firm Performance.
Wernerfelt, B., & Montgomery, C. A. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 396
Patent Statistics as a Measure of Technical Change
Comanor, W. S., & Scherer, F. M. (1969) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259522 · Cited by 345
Heil, J. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625367 · Cited by 318
The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators
Lanjouw, J., & Schankerman, M. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7345 · Cited by 309
Transaction costs, mistakes, and performance: Assessing the importance of governance
Masten, S. E. (1993) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.4090140205 · Cited by 290
Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-experimental Causal Studies
Dehejia, R., & Wahba, S. (1998) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6829 · Cited by 181
Discouraging opportunistic behavior in collaborative R & D: A new role for government
Tripsas, M., Schrader, S., & Sobrero, M. (1995) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/0048-7333(93)00771-k · Cited by 172
Why Should Firms Cooperate? The Strategy and Economics Basis for Cooperative Ventures
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (2004) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256549.003.0002 · Cited by 154
Jaffe, A. B., & Trajtenberg, M. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5712 · Cited by 132
Joint Ventures and Collaborative Arrangements in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry
Pisano, G. P., Russo, M. V., & Teece, D. J. (1988) · Cited by 131
Fiml Estimation of Sample Selection Models for Count Data
Greene, W. H. (2001) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1677-4_6 · Cited by 75
Cited by
Interfirm Collaboration Networks: The Impact of Large-Scale Network Structure on Firm Innovation
Schilling, M. A., & Phelps, C. C. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0624 · Cited by 1,551
Chesbrough, H. W., & Appleyard, M. M. (2007) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166416 · Cited by 1,417
Co-opetition between giants: Collaboration with competitors for technological innovation
Gnyawali, D. R., & Park, B.-J. (. (2011) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.01.009 · Cited by 1,044
When Does Trust Matter to Alliance Performance?
Krishnan, R., Martin, X., & Noorderhaven, N. G. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.22798171 · Cited by 1,036
Make, Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.21794670 · Cited by 928
Metadata
- Authors
- Sampson, R. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-10-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 484-526
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123830417
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 27.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.