Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility.
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Cited by
Artificial intelligence in health care: accountability and safety
Habli, I., Lawton, T., & Porter, Z. (2020) · Bulletin of the World Health Organization · doi:10.2471/blt.19.237487 · Cited by 357
“Many philosophers deine two conditions for a person to be morally responsible for an action: the control condition (control over the decision or action, where loss of control is not due to recklessness) and the epistemic condition (suicient understanding of the decision or action and its likely consequences, where ign…”
BackgroundNarrative responsibility and artificial intelligence
Coeckelbergh, M. (2023) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-021-01375-x · Cited by 81
“These are important questions, which are being discussed in the literature on ethics of robotics and AI (Hakli 2019; Johnson 2014; Santoro et al. 2008; Coeckel-bergh 2020; Yeung 2018; Santoni de Sio and Mecacci 2021).”
BackgroundAdvice from artificial intelligence: a review and practical implications
Baines, J. I., Dalal, R. S., Ponce, L. P., & Tsai, H.-C. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1390182 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Hakli, R., & Mäkelä, P.
- Venue
- The Monist
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2019-03-09
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-275
- ISSN
- 0026-9662 (ISSN-L)
- 2153-3601
- OpenAlex
- W2920815137
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 53.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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