How mood tunes prediction: a neurophenomenological account of mood and its disturbance in major depression
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article, we propose a neurophenomenological account of what moods are, and how they work. We draw upon phenomenology to show how mood attunes a person to a space of significant possibilities. Mood structures a person’s lived experience by fixing the kinds of significance the world can have for them in a given situation. We employ Karl Friston’s free-energy principle to show how this phenomenological concept of mood can be smoothly integrated with cognitive neuroscience. We will argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with the aim of minimizing expected free energy—a measure of uncertainty about the future consequences of actions. Moods summarize how the organism is faring overall in its predictive engagements, tuning the organism’s expectations about how it is likely to fare in the future. Agents that act to minimize expected free energy will have a feeling of how well or badly they are doing at maintaining grip on the multiple possibilities that matter to them. They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that structures the possibilities they are ready to engage with over long time-scales, just as moods do.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 22×
“The FEP posits that so long as the internal and external dynamics change over time to minimize free energy, the result will be that the organism will remain well adapted to its niche.”
BackgroundInfluentialA Rich Landscape of Affordances
Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2014.958035 · Cited by 1,160 · cited 2×
“(Our ecological-enactive interpretation of FEP is developed in more detail in earlier articles co-authored with Jelle Bruineberg—see Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014, Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018.)”
MethodSelf-citationFriston, K. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0475 · Cited by 754 · cited 1×
“The principle was formulated by Karl Friston to understand the organizational properties of complex biological systems, from plants and single cells all the way up to humans, and the social networks they form with each other (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston 2010, 2013; Allen and Friston 2018).”
BackgroundHow unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality
Sharot, T., Korn, C. W., & Dolan, R. J. (2011) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.2949 · Cited by 729
Friston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9237-y · Cited by 673
The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind
Colombetti, G. (2014) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262019958.001.0001 · Cited by 622
An active inference theory of allostasis and interoception in depression
Barrett, L. F., Quigley, K. S., & Hamilton, P. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0011 · Cited by 554 · cited 2×
“(We see this in the physiology of the person in the hyperactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis—the body stress response—and in proinflammatory immune activity that produce sickness behaviours aimed at reducing energy expenditure (Barrett et al. 2016).”
BackgroundA computational and neural model of momentary subjective well-being
Rutledge, R. B., Skandali, N., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1407535111 · Cited by 444 · cited 1×
“Given their past experience, can an agent expect a future in which free energy will be reduced at an accelerating or at a decelerating rate? A positive mood like happiness depends not only on things going well, but on them going better than you had expected (Rutledge et al. 2014).”
BackgroundReinforcement learning or active inference?
Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2009) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006421 · Cited by 443
Mood as representation of momentum
Eldar, E., Rutledge, R. B., Dolan, R. J., & Niv, Y. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.07.010 · Cited by 383 · cited 3×
“comes from work showing that low serotonin makes people insensitive to negative outcomes (Bari et al. 2010; Eldar et al. 2016).”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Play in predictive minds: A cognitive theory of play.
Andersen, M. M., Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Roepstorff, A. (2023) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000369 · Cited by 122
Self-citationLosing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation
Deane, G., Miller, M., & Wilkinson, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539726 · Cited by 87
“Depression can be understood as a domain general inference of loss of allostatic control, where, in extreme cases, the system ceases to posit itself as a causally efficacious agent (Fabry, 2019; Kiverstein et al., 2020).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDeane, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab024 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Rietveld, E.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2020-01-01
- Volume
- 2020
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niaa003-niaa003
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3049709870
- Cited by
- 55
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 4.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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