Cited by 87Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePsychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments

Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation

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Deane, George, Miller, Mark, Wilkinson, Sam·2020·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and "enlightened" states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by "tuning" agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Allen M. Tsakiris M. (2018). “ The body as first prior: interoceptive predictive processing and the primacy,” in The Interoceptive Mind: From Homeostasis to Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2– 7.
  2. Smith L. S. Hesp C. Lutz A. Mattout J. Friston K. Ramstead M. (2020). Towards a formal neurophenomenology of metacognition: modelling meta-awareness, mental action, and attentional control with deep active inference. PsyArXiv. [Preprint] Available online at: https://psyarxiv.com/5jh3c/

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Authors
Deane, G., Miller, M., & Wilkinson, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Edinburgh (GB)
  • University of Sussex (GB)
  • University of Exeter (GB)
Corresponding author
Miller, Mark
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2020-10-29
Volume
11
Pages
539726-539726
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3096810469
Cited by
87
References
118
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 10
FWCI
5.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
European Research Council
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
Keywords
active inference, depersonalization, meditation, selfhood, self-modeling, dissociative disorders, counterfactual reasoning, phenomenal consciousness, meditation therapy

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