Formalizing falsification for theories of consciousness across computational hierarchies
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because it quantified subjective experience in a scalar mathematical measure called Φ that is in principle measurable. Epistemological issues in the form of the “unfolding argument” have provided a concrete refutation of IIT by demonstrating how it permits functionally identical systems to have differences in their predicted consciousness. The implication is that IIT and any other proposed theory based on a physical system’s causal structure may already be falsified even in the absence of experimental refutation. However, so far many of these arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of falsification arguments, such as the unfolding argument, are too abstract to determine the full scope of their implications. Here, we make these abstract arguments concrete, by providing a simple example of functionally equivalent machines realizable with table-top electronics that take the form of isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback. This allows us to explicitly demonstrate the different levels of abstraction at which a theory of consciousness can be assessed. Within this computational hierarchy, we show how IIT is simultaneously falsified at the finite-state automaton level and unfalsifiable at the combinatorial-state automaton level. We use this example to illustrate a more general set of falsification criteria for theories of consciousness: to avoid being already falsified, or conversely unfalsifiable, scientific theories of consciousness must be invariant with respect to changes that leave the inference procedure fixed at a particular level in a computational hierarchy.
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“This is because the internal binary update sequence depends on the interactions among the internal units [29, 53], which differ in the three cases, as can easily be determined through manipulations and observations.”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [53]
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Cites
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Cited by
Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., et al. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · Cited by 292
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IIT-Concerned, Fleming, S. M., Frith, C. D., Goodale, M., Lau, H., LeDoux, J. E., Lee, A. L. F., Michel, M., Owen, A. M., Peters, M. A. K., et al. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zsr78 · Cited by 81
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab001 · Cited by 46
Metzinger, T. K. (2024) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15196.001.0001 · Cited by 101
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.03541 · Cited by 46
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BackgroundOn the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory
Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad014 · Cited by 19
Self-citationFirst-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
“Despite these qualities, IIT has been strongly criticized in recent years (Aaronson, 2014b, 2014a; Cerullo, 2015; Doerig et al., 2019, Doerig, Schurger, et al., 2020; Hanson, 2021; Hanson & Walker, 2020; Hanson & Walker, 2021; Lau & Michel, 2019; Merker et al., 2021).”
BackgroundA bibliometric evaluation of the impact of theories of consciousness in academia and on social media
Yeung, A. W. K., Cushing, C. A., & Lee, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103296 · Cited by 10
Lehmann, M., Neumann, C., Wasserthal, S., Delis, A., Schultz, J., Hurlemann, R., & Ettinger, U. (2022) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113925 · Cited by 5
What is a Pseudoscience of Consciousness? Lessons from Recent Adversarial CollaborationsPreprint
Lau, H. C. (2023) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/28z3y · Cited by 6
Algorithmic structure of experience and the unfolding argumentPreprint
Ruffini, G., Lopez-Sola, E., & Vohryzek, J. (2022) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/7nbsw · Cited by 4
Loops all the way up: Recurrency as an implementation-first primitive for consciousness
Zheng, Z., Chis-Ciure, R., Waade, P. T., Eiserbeck, A., Aru, J., Andrillon, T., Jarraya, B., Melloni, L., Northoff, G., Rosas, F. E., et al. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2026.07.006 · Cited by 2
Chis-Ciure, R. (2025) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2025.2550245 · Cited by 2
“1 In particular, it aims to clarify and potentially strengthen IIT’s theoretical foundations that have been recently challenged (Doerig et al. 2019; Hanson and Walker 2021; Kleiner and Hoel 2021; Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf 2022; Pautz 2019).”
Quantum Superpositions of Conscious States in a Minimal Integrated Information Model
McQueen, K. J., Durham, I. T., & Müller, M. P. (2026) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e28040394 · Cited by 2
(2024) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15196.003.0041
Formalizing Consciousness: Integrating AI with Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
Chatterjee, S., Srivastva, S., Atrey, P., Sah, N., & Das, S. (2026) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-25080-3_3
Metadata
- Authors
- Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I.
- Affiliations
- Arizona State University (US)
- Santa Fe Institute (US)
- Corresponding author
- Walker, Sara I
- ORCID
- Walker, Sara I
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-05-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab014-niab014
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8339439
- OpenAlex
- W3083297807
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 2.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation and the Foundational Questions
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, theory of consciousness, falsification, computational hierarchy, finite automata, digital circuits, feedback, levels of abstraction, epistemology of science, unfalsifiability
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