Phenomenal Concepts
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience. These are called ‘phenomenal concepts’ (PCs) and they are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experiences strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia.
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Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Loar, B. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214188 · Cited by 341
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242
Self-citationThe Epistemic View of Subjectivity
Sturgeon, S., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1994) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940751 · Cited by 92
Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Irvine, E. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9273-4 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Balog, K.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-02
- Pages
- 292-312
- OpenAlex
- W4210848715
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 1.24
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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