The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths and truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusions. This article views that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if one is careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic premises to modal conclusions (about necessity and possibility), and from there to ontological conclusions. Here the crucial issue is the link between the epistemic and modal domains.
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Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citationConceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242 · cited 1×
“Balog (1999) has suggested that there must be something wrong with the argument, on the grounds that if zombies are possible, they could make a parallel argument to the conclusion that materialism is false in their world.”
BackgroundDeeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge
HAWTHORNE, J. (2002) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00201.x · Cited by 201
Cited by
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432
“3 For a much-elaborated version of the argument using two-dimensional semantics, see Chalmers 2009.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008 · Cited by 231
Self-citationWhy panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Goff, P. (2009) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x · Cited by 163
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113
Self-citationReal Acquaintance and Physicalism
Goff, P. (2015) · Phenomenal Qualities · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005 · Cited by 79
“20 In Goff 2011 I rather uncharitably called dual revelation ‘the Thesis of Dubious Intelligibility.’ 21 Nic Damnjanovic (2012) has explicitly defended the plausibility of this kind of PCS physicalism, and, in conversation, Ned Block seems sympathetic.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-02
- Pages
- 313-336
- OpenAlex
- W2219777791
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 34.84
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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