Bayesian Perceptual Psychology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Contemporary perceptual psychology uses Bayesian decision theory to develop Helmholtz’s view that perception involves ‘unconscious inference’. The science provides mathematically rigorous, empirically well-confirmed explanations for diverse perceptual constancies and illusions. The explanations assign a central role to mental representation. This article highlights the explanatory centrality of representation within current Bayesian perceptual models. The article also discusses how Bayesian perceptual psychology bears upon several prominent philosophical topics, including: eliminativism about representation (defended by Churchland, Field, Quine, and Stich); relationalism about perception (endorsed by Brewer, Campbell, Martin, and Travis); phenomenal content (postulated by Chalmers, Horgan and Tienson, and Thompson); and the computational theory of mind (espoused by Fodor and many other philosophers).
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588
Perception as Bayesian Inference
(1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511984037 · Cited by 1,425
Motion illusions as optimal percepts
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-858 · Cited by 1,076
Travis, C. (2004) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/113.449.57 · Cited by 469
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
Illusions, perception and Bayes
Geisler, W. S., & Kersten, D. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-508 · Cited by 249 · cited 1×
“…a rigorous mathematical framework for representing the physical and statistical properties of the environment, describing the tasks that perceptual systems are trying to perform, and deriving appropriate computational theories of how to perform those tasks’ (Geisler and Kersten, 2002, 508).”
BackgroundProbabilistic models in human sensorimotor control
Wolpert, D. M. (2007) · Human Movement Science · doi:10.1016/j.humov.2007.05.005 · Cited by 212
Bayesian decision theory as a model of human visual perception: Testing Bayesian transfer
MALONEY, L. T., & MAMASSIAN, P. (2009) · Visual Neuroscience · doi:10.1017/s0952523808080905 · Cited by 180
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
What are the contents of representations in predictive processing?
Wiese, W. (2017) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9472-0 · Cited by 66
“Having computed the posterior, one can then settle on a single hypothesis (like the hypothesis that maximizes either the posterior or some utility function, cf. Rescorla 2015).”
MethodWilliams, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x · Cited by 63
Pragmatism and the predictive mind
Williams, D. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9556-5 · Cited by 22
“Bayesian perceptual psychology models the solution to this problem in terms of Bayesian inference, where Bayes’s theorem identifies an optimal way of updating one’s beliefs given new evidence under conditions of uncertainty (Rescorla 2013).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Rescorla, M.
- Venue
- Oxford Handbooks Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2013-09-05
- OpenAlex
- W2633336044
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 2.10
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.010
- The paper
- Rescorla, M. (2013). Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. Oxford Handbooks Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.010
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.