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Cited by 63Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of Science

Predictive coding and thought

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Williams, Daniel·2020·Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x
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Abstract

Predictive processing has recently been advanced as a global cognitive architecture for the brain. I argue that its commitments concerning the nature and format of cognitive representation are inadequate to account for two basic characteristics of conceptual thought: first, its generality—the fact that we can think and flexibly reason about phenomena at any level of spatial and temporal scale and abstraction; second, its rich compositionality—the specific way in which concepts productively combine to yield our thoughts. I consider two strategies for avoiding these objections and I argue that both confront formidable challenges.

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  • The FEP's universal scope and mathematical generality render it effectively unfalsifiable.

    “Williams (2018); Williams and Colling (2018); Williams (2020) argued that the FEP’s universal scope and mathematical generality render it effectively unfalsifiable.”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Williams 2020

    Section 5 says there is plausibly nothing that could falsify the bare claim that the brain is Bayesian and that a similar point may apply to the prediction-error-minimization framework. But Section 2 distinguishes that framework from the free-energy principle (FEP) and says the paper will have little to say about the FEP. The paper therefore supports a related falsifiability concern, not the specific claim that the FEP’s universal scope and mathematical generality render it unfalsifiable. (LLM, conf=0.87)

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  • The free energy principle, which incorporates and extends the Bayesian brain hypothesis, has been especially subject to criticism for unfalsifiability because its mathematical formalism and conceptual elasticity enable it to accommodate virtually any empirical outcome.

    “The FEP, which incorporates and extends the Bayesian brain hypothesis, has been especially subject to such criticism. As Williams (2020) and Colombo and Wright (2021) have persuasively argued, the FEP’s sweeping mathematical formalism and conceptual elasticity enable it to accommodate virtually any empirical outcome, rendering it difficult—if not impossible—to falsify (Fig. 2).”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Williams 2020

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Clark, A. (2000). Mindware (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
  2. Clark, A. (2016). Surfing uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  3. Fodor, J. (2011). Fire the press secretary. [Review of the book Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite: Evolution and the modular mind.] London Review of Books, 33(9), 24-25. Retrieved from https://www.lrb.co. uk/v33/n09/jerry-fodor/fire-the-press-secretary.
  4. Gerstenberg, T., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (in press). Intuitive theories. In M. Waldman (Ed.), Oxford handbook of causal reasoning. Oxford University Press.
  5. Symons, P. Calvo, & S. Robins (Eds.), Routledge handbook to the philosophy of psychology. Routledge.
  6. Mountcastle, V. (1978). An organizing principle for cerebral function: The unit model and the distributed system. In G. M. Edelman & V. B. Mountcastle (Eds.), The mindful brain. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
  7. Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  8. Penny, W. (2012b). Bayesian models of brain and behaviour. ISRN Biomathematics, 2012, 1-19. https:// doi.org/10.5402/2012/785791. · DOI
  9. Sloman, S. (2005). Causal models. New York: Oxford University Press.
  10. Vance, J. (2015). Review of the predictive mind. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

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Authors
Williams, D.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Williams, Daniel
ORCID
Williams, Daniel
Venue
Synthese
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2018-03-24
Volume
197
Issue
4
Pages
1749-1775
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
DOI
10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x
OpenAlex
W2792648290
Cited by
63
References
90
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2
FWCI
3.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (cc-by)
Funders
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
predictive processing, predictive coding, conceptual thinking, mental representation, compositional semantics, conceptual combination, cognitive architecture, abstraction, spatial and temporal scales

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