The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk
Open accessAbstract
We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By specifying decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from prospect theory, which we test.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 2×
“With the same logic our model can account for the Tversky and Kahneman (1981) famous framing experiments, even with a linear value function.”
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Koszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/121.4.1133 · Cited by 2,728
Stalking the elusive “vividness” effect
Taylor, S. E., & Thompson, S. C. (1982) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.89.2.155 · Cited by 913 · cited 1×
“As Taylor and Thompson (1982) put it: “Salience refers to the phenomenon that when one’s attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent judgments.””
Cited by
Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows
HARTZMARK, S. M., & SUSSMAN, A. B. (2019) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12841 · Cited by 1,711
Human Decisions and Machine Predictions
Kleinberg, J., Lakkaraju, H., Leskovec, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx032 · Cited by 1,040
Human Decisions and Machine Predictions
Kleinberg, J., Lakkaraju, H., Leskovec, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2017) · doi:10.3386/w23180 · Cited by 545
Gennaioli, N., Ma, Y., & Shleifer, A. (2016) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/685965 · Cited by 332
Self-citationDamgaard, M. T., & Nielsen, H. S. (2018) · Economics of Education Review · doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.03.008 · Cited by 321
Metadata
- Authors
- Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-06-20
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1243-1285
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2140619986
- Cited by
- 1,287
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 30.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
