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Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk
Open accessAbstract
We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By specifying decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from prospect theory, which we test.
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Self-citationHuman Decisions and Machine Predictions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-06-20
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1243-1285
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2140619986
- Cited by
- 1,287
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 30.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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