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Can Managerial Discretion Explain Observed Leverage Ratios?
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes the impact of managerial discretion and corporate control mechanisms on leverage and firm value within a contingent claims model where the manager derives perquisites from investment. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax adavantage of debt less bankruptcy costs and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Actual capital structure reflects the trade-off made by the manager between his empire-building desires and the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. The model shows that manager-shareholder conflicts can explain the low debt levels observed in practice. It also examines the impact of these conflicts on the cross-sectional variation in capital structures.
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Self-citation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Morellec, E.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-10-15
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 257-294
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2091530448
- Cited by
- 360
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 62.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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