The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting
Abstract
We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, low-productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms. This behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy. We test the predictions of the model using firm-level data. We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. Our firm-level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000. In the aggregate, our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment-less growth.
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Cited by
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books
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Does Earnings Management Affect Firms’ Investment Decisions?
McNichols, M. F., & Stubben, S. R. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.6.1571 · Cited by 961
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kedia, S., & Philippon, T.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-03-17
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2169-2199
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2889572517
- Cited by
- 448
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 64.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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