The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Law Affects Lending
Open accessAbstract
The paper investigates the effect of legal change on the lending behavior of banks in twelve transition economies. First, we find that banks increase the supply of credit subsequent to legal change. Second, changes in collateral law matter more for increases in bank lending than do changes in bankruptcy law. We attribute this finding to the different functions of collateral and bankruptcy law. While the former enhances the likelihood that individual creditors can realize their claims against a debtor, the latter ensures an orderly process for resolving multiple, and often conflicting, claims after a debtor has become insolvent. Finally, we find that foreign-owned banks respond more strongly to legal change than incumbents.
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Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
Private credit in 129 countries☆
DJANKOV, S., MCLIESH, C., & SHLEIFER, A. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.004 · Cited by 2,795
How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans
QIAN, J., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01293.x · Cited by 1,102
Debt Enforcement around the World
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/595015 · Cited by 929
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13608 · Cited by 892
Metadata
- Authors
- Haselmann, R., Pistor, K., & Vig, V.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-09-29
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 549-580
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2259637905
- Cited by
- 428
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 29.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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