The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy
Open accessAbstract
Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings.Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving.Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality).Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.
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“In addition, managers may use CSR to pursue personal goals or for their private benefit, in which case CSR gives rise to an agency problem (e.g., Masulis and Reza 2015).”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Masulis and Reza 2015
Citations
Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Altschuller, 2010, Distinctions with differences: The lawyer's role in distinguishing CSR and corporate philanthropy, International Law News, 39, 11
- Bebchuk L. Fried J. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press; 2004.
- Chetty, 2005, Dividend taxs and corporate behavior: Evidence from the 2003 dividend tax cut, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 3, 791
- Cohen, 2002, Corporate giving: De-cloaking stealth philanthropy, Nonprofit Quarterly, 9, 47
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Firms and social responsibility: A review of ESG and CSR research in corporate finance
Gillan, S., Koch, A., & Starks, L. T. (2021) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101889 · Cited by 3,447
Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence
Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.013 · Cited by 2,547
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Albuquerque, R. A., Koskinen, Y. J., & Zhang, C. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3043 · Cited by 2,392
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic
Ding, W., Levine, R., Lin, C., & Xie, W. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.03.005 · Cited by 1,484
Metadata
- Authors
- Masulis, R. W., & Reza, S. W.
- Affiliations
- UNSW Sydney (AU)
- Queensland University of Technology (AU)
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-11-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 592-636
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2247506531
- Cited by
- 1,020
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 101 · 2025: 156 · 2024: 161 · 2023: 140 · 2022: 138 · 2021: 85 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 53.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
- QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- QUT Business School
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
- Keywords
- corporate philanthropy, agency theory, optimal contracting, shareholder valuation, cash holdings, dividends, CEO shareholding, corporate governance quality, CEO compensation, firm value
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