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Symptom perception, placebo effects, and the Bayesian brain
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1. Introduction The standard and ideal biomedical model of symptom perception treats the brain largely as a passive stimulus-driven organ. It embraces the notion that the brain absorbs sensory signals from the body and converts them, directly, into conscious experience. Accordingly, biomedicine operates under the assumption that symptoms are the direct consequences of physiological dysfunction and improvement is the direct consequence of the restoration of bodily function. Despite its success, the biomedical model has failed to provide an adequate account of 2 well-demonstrated phenomena in medicine: (1) the experience of symptoms without pathophysiological disruption, and (2) the experience of relief after the administration of placebo treatments. This topical review advances the idea that “predictive processing,” a Bayesian approach to perception that is rapidly taking hold in neuroscience, significantly helps accommodating these 2 phenomena. It expands on recent high-quality empirical work on predictive processing1,7,19,24 and outlines, more broadly, how Bayesian models offer an altogether different picture of how the brain perceives symptoms and relief. 2. The Bayesian brain The nervous system is constantly dealing with a continuous and potentially overwhelming stream of varying signals coming from our body and senses. For the sake of adaptation, the brain must turn this confused play of sensory inputs and neural firings into a reliable perception of the world. Debate in cognitive science has revolved around how exactly the brain accomplishes this task. While previous theories, in line with the current biomedical model of disease, viewed perception mostly as a bottom-up readout of sensory signals, emerging Bayesian models suggest, instead, that perception is cognitively (mostly nonconsciously) modulated, and might be best viewed as a process of prediction, based on an integration of sensory inputs, prior experience, and contextual cues.9,10,15,21 The key suggestion is that to perceive the world, the brain follows a theory of probability known as Bayes rule. In its mathematical form, the rule updates the likelihood of a given hypothesis (or “prior”), given some evidence, by considering the product of the likelihood and the prior probability of the hypothesis.21 Over rapid time scales, the brain implements Bayes rule by continuously generating a top-down cascade of neurally encoded (mostly nonconscious) hypotheses about the state of the body and world. This top-down flow of hypotheses is met by the bottom-up stream of sensory inputs coming from the senses. Any mismatch between predicted input and actual input results in “prediction error,” which prompts the system to revise its hypotheses. Bottom-up perception is thus inseparable from top-down prediction. Some of the hypotheses that account for the most abstract and general features of the world are “built-in” by evolution; others are amenable to progressive refinement through developmental learning. Throughout one's lifespan, the nervous system engages in the continuous updating of these priors to better predict the next incoming sensory inputs and minimize error. A central implication of the theory is that what we perceive is not the world as it actually is, but the brain's best guess of it, continuously refined by incoming sensory evidence.10,21 Visual perception, the domain from which much of the evidence for the Bayesian brain has emerged, offers the most intuitive way to grasp its key principle. To mention a simplistic example, sticks in a forest that is infested by snakes might at first be perceived as snakes, until we get a more refined view that updates the hypothesis. Importantly, the interplay between descending predictions and ascending signals that lie at the heart of predictive processing is flexibly modulated by the “precision” (or “inverse variance,” in statistical terms) of hypotheses and sensory evidence. Faced with the task of determining how likely a given set of inputs represents a predicted state, the brain uses prior experience and subtle contextual cues to determine their precision. The example of seeing sticks as snakes represents a case where highly precise hypotheses shaped by previous experience (knowing what a snake looks like, knowing that snakes inhabit the forest) override imprecise visual inputs. Indeed, the Bayesian brain model is able to explain how, in contexts of precise predictions and imprecise inputs, perceptions can deviate from the actual state of the world.10,33 Conversely, it also elucidates how inferences can be made under conditions of ambiguity that lack precise estimates.17,28 The model is supported by growing computational and neuroimaging evidence, and advances the notion that the precision of descending predictions might be “encoded” in the brain by neurotransmitters such as dopamine.16 3. Symptom perception and “medically unexplained symptoms” The idea that what we perceive is not the world as it is but
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Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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Unraveling Negative Expectations and Nocebo-Related Effects in Musculoskeletal Pain
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Psychological Interventions for the Treatment of Chronic Pain in Adults
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Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ongaro, G., & Kaptchuk, T. J.
- Venue
- Pain
- Published
- 2018-08-06
- Volume
- 160
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-4
- ISSN
- 0304-3959 (ISSN-L)
- 1872-6623
- OpenAlex
- W2887718708
- Cited by
- 208
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 9.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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