Higher order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-description process
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world and on other people through three predictive loops: an inner loop, a perception–action loop and a self–other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with signal detection theory, highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both type I (objective) and type II (subjective, metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is closer to dual-route models in which it is assumed that the re-descriptions made possible by the emergence of meta-representations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social cognition involve the same mechanisms.
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Cited by
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Self-citationSelf-Evaluation of Decision-Making: A General Bayesian Framework for Metacognitive Computation
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Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
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Metacognition: computation, biology and function
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- Timmermans, B., Schilbach, L., Pasquali, A., & Cleeremans, A.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2012-05-19
- Volume
- 367
- Issue
- 1594
- Pages
- 1412-1423
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2126714074
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 4.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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