The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games
Open accessAbstract
We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present in addition to unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by imitation based on the random sequential comparison of neighbors' payoff for a fixed level of noise. Using numerical simulations, we evaluate the strategy frequencies and phase diagrams when varying the synergy factor, punishment cost, and fine. Our attention is focused on two extreme cases describing all the relevant behaviors in such a complex system. According to our numerical data peer punishers prevail and control the system behavior in a large segments of parameters while pool punishers can only survive in the limit of weak peer punishment when a rich variety of solutions is observed. Paradoxically, the two types of punishment may extinguish each other's impact, resulting in the triumph of defectors. The technical difficulties and suggested methods are briefly discussed.
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Citations
Cites
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Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
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Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
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Cited by
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Self-citationSelf-organization of punishment in structured populations
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2012) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/14/4/043013 · Cited by 259
Self-citationCombination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Sun, W., Liu, L., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844 · Cited by 80
Self-citationThe evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion
Quan, J., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5119395 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Szolnoki, A., Szabó, G., & Czakó, L.
- Venue
- Physical Review E
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2011-10-17
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 046106-046106
- ISSN
- 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
- 1550-2376
- OpenAlex
- W2026230959
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 28.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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