The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing economies: evidence from Nigeria
Abstract
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between corporate governance structure and firm performance in Nigeria. Design/methodology/approach: The present study uses the regression model to analyze publicly available data for a sample of 107 firms quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the fiscal years 1998 to 2002. Findings: The empirical investigations showed that ownership concentration has a positive impact on performance. Although the results revealed no evidence to support the impact of board composition on performance, there is significant evidence to support the fact that CEO duality adversely impact firm performance. The result also suggests firm size and leverage to impact on firm performance. A new variable, identified as more than one family member on the board, is found to have an adverse effect on firm performance. Research limitations/implications: The study relied much on publicly available data for a sample of 107 listed firms in Nigeria for the fiscal years 1998 to 2002. Thus, effort should be made to look at this study in a more elaborate viewpoint and across borders. Practical implications: Good corporate governance standards are imperative to every organization and should be encouraged for the interest of the investors and other stakeholders. Originality/value: Interestingly, from a developing country perspective, especially in sub‐Saharan Africa, the paper is the first of its kind and offers evidence on the impact of corporate governance structure on firm performance. The paper provides useful information that is of great value to policy makers, academics and other stakeholders.
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Citations
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Cited by
Corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries: evidence from India
Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-01-2016-0018 · Cited by 516
Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey
Ciftci, I., Tatoglu, E., Wood, G., Demirbag, M., & Zaim, S. (2019) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2018.08.004 · Cited by 370
The Measurements of Firm Performance’s Dimensions
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Fadzil, F. H. B. (2014) · Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting · doi:10.5296/ajfa.v6i1.4761 · Cited by 309
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Gallego-Álvarez, I. (2020) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-019-00330-x · Cited by 291
Shahwan, T. M. (2015) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-11-2014-0140 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Ehikioya, B. I.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2009-06-12
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 231-243
- ISSN
- 1472-0701 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2039350639
- Cited by
- 414
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 28.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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