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Chapter 5 Brave New Digital Work? New Forms of Performance Control in Crowdwork
Open accessAbstract
The term “crowdwork” describes a new form of digital work that is organized and regulated by internet-based platforms. This chapter examines how crowdwork platforms ensure their virtual workforce’s commitment and control its performance despite its high mobility, anonymity, and dispersion. The findings are based on a case study analysis of 15 microtask and macrotask platforms, encompassing 32 interviews with representatives of crowdwork platforms, and crowdworkers, as well as an analysis of the platforms’ homepages and community spaces. The chapter shows that performance control on crowd platforms relies on a combination of direct control, reputation systems, and community building, which have until now been studied in isolation or entirely ignored. Moreover, the findings suggest that while all three elements can be found on both microtask and macrotask platforms, their functionality and purpose differ. Overall, the findings highlight that platforms are no neutral intermediaries but organizations that adopt an active role in structuring the digital labor process and in shaping working conditions. Their managerial structures are coded and objectified into seemingly neutral technological infrastructures, whereby the underlying power relations between capital and labor become obscured.
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The impact of using algorithmic management to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work.
“The impact of the use of AM to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig-work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work (Curchod, Patriotta, Cohen, & Neysen, 2019;Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019;Rosenblat, 2018;Shapiro, 2018).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn gig work, the algorithmic task allocation process is highly contingent on demand or customer satisfaction scores.
“In gig work, the algorithmic task allocation process is highly contingent on demand or customer satisfaction scores (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Gregory, 2020;Griesbach et al., 2019).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
The Microtask platforms section (pp. 21–22) says algorithmically organised rankings help allocate tasks and draw on ratings of completed jobs, including client ratings. The paper does not establish that allocation is contingent on demand, and it describes other factors besides customer ratings, including experience and activity (p. 21; Discussion and Conclusions, p. 33). Its findings concern crowdwork platforms, not gig work generally. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAlgorithmic systems facilitate high contingency of performance scores on customer satisfaction ratings in gig work and traditional work settings.
“Moreover, algorithmic systems facilitate high contingency of performance scores on customer satisfaction ratings, both in gig work (Curchod et al., 2019;Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019) and in traditional work settings such as restaurants (O'Donovan, 2018), retail (Evans & Kitchin, 2018;Levy & Barocas, 2018), or telecommunications (Bakewell et al., 2018).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
The Macrotask platforms section (p. 24) says reputation is primarily an average of past ratings, often given by clients, supporting the claim for some gig work. But the Microtask platforms section (p. 22) says client ratings are mostly voluntary and often insufficient, while the Discussion and Conclusions (p. 33) describes other inputs to algorithmic rankings. The citation is attached to gig work, not the sentence’s examples of traditional workplaces. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the gig economy, the termination procedure starts with the platform notifying a worker of unsatisfying ratings and probability of account deactivation if no improvement, followed by official account deactivation.
“Mainly found in the gig economy, this procedure starts with the platform notifying a worker of unsatisfying ratings and probability of account deactivation if no improvement, followed by official account deactivation (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019;Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
The Microtask platforms section (p. 22) says low ratings can limit access to work until a worker sees no jobs on the dashboard. It does not describe the claimed termination procedure: a warning about ratings and possible deactivation, followed by official account deactivation. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredFor gig workers like ridesharing drivers or delivery workers, having the power to decline tasks without implicit or explicit penalties or prejudice could prevent workers from the accumulation of frustrating, low-paid or alienating tasks.
“Also, for gig workers like ridesharing drivers or delivery workers, having the power to decline tasks without implicit or explicit penalties or prejudice could prevent workers from the accumulation of frustrating, low-paid or alienating tasks (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
The Microtask platforms section (p. 23) reports that a worker can actively decline a job without losing points, while failing to respond to an offer can affect their rating. This supports the relevance of penalties to task choice, but the paper studies online crowdwork and expressly excludes offline work such as driving and food delivery (Introduction, p. 3). It does not say that penalty-free refusal prevents an accumulation of frustrating, low-paid, or alienating tasks. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Algorithmic task allocation is largely found in the gig economy and platform work, and in traditional work sectors like telecommunication, electronics, public transports, and parcel delivery.
“Algorithmic task allocation is largely found in the gig economy and platform work (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Lee et al., 2015;Rosenblat, 2018), and in traditional work sectors like telecommunication (Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2017), electronics (Gershgorn, 2015;Hitachi, 2015), public transports (Hodson, 2014), and parcel delivery (Stevens, 2015).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
Algorithmic metrics can play a central role in the performance management process of gig workers.
“Some studies have described how these metrics can play a central role (if not the entire role) in the performance management process of both traditional workers (Bakewell et al., 2018;Dhir & Chhabra, 2019;Evans & Kitchin, 2018;Kirven, 2018;Levy & Barocas, 2018) and gig workers (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
Customer satisfaction ratings are questioned for their volatility, reliability, and validity.
“The strong impact of these ratings, largely questioned about their volatility, the reliability and validity (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Greenwood, Adjerid, & Angst, 2019;Luca & Zervas, 2016;Orlikowski & Scott, 2013;Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, & Hwang, 2017), has been associated with workers' perception of job insecurity (Curchod et al., 2019;Veen et al., 2019).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gerber, C., & Krzywdzinski, M.
- Venue
- Research in the Sociology of Work
- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing Limited
- Published
- 2019-06-14
- Pages
- 121-143
- ISSN
- 0277-2833 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2952516309
- Cited by
- 84
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 101.36
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- Research in the sociology of work (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Legal and Labor Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
- Keywords
- crowdwork, performance control, digital labor, reputation systems, community building, platform governance, platform intermediaries, working conditions
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