A Trusted Approach for Decentralised and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 33 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Identity Management (IdM) systems have traditionally relied on a centralized model prone to privacy, trust, and security problems, like potential massive data breaches or identity spoofing. Identity providers accumulate excessive power that might allow them to become a big brother, analyzing and storing as much data as possible. Users should be able to trust identity providers and manage their personal information straightforwardly without compromising their privacy. The European OLYMPUS project introduces a distributed approach for IdM based on enhanced Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) that splits the role of Identity Provider to limit their influence and chances to become a unique point of failure. However, the trust relationship between service providers, users, and identity providers is still a gap in those kinds of privacy-preserving ABC systems. Decentralized technologies are an opportunity to break away from the centralized model and propose systems that respect privacy while increasing users' trust. This paper presents an evolution of the OLYMPUS architecture, maintaining all the privacy features and incorporating distributed ledger technologies to enhance trust and security in online transactions and IdM systems. The proposed system has been implemented, tested, and validated, showing its performance and feasibility to manage user's identity in a fully privacy-preserving, distributed and reliable way.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper proposes a blockchain-aware extension to the OLYMPUS distributed identity-management architecture, aiming to strengthen trust while preserving privacy. It reports a prototype using Hyperledger Fabric and says the pilot deployment showed no usability penalty, while also identifying query-time growth and limited-device cryptography as future concerns.
## Key findings
- The proposed system keeps OLYMPUS privacy properties while adding a ledger as a tamper-proof registry for identity-provider and service-provider metadata, so users and services can consult registered data at any time.
- In the implementation, the authors deployed an Android user client, three Java-based partial IdPs, a JavaScript blockchain handler, and Hyperledger Fabric v2 on OpenStack.
- Partial IdP setup took between 33.43 to 36.1 seconds in the local scenario and 41.1 to 45.86 seconds in the remote scenario.
- The paper says the most expensive blockchain-handler methods are those requiring ledger searches, such as getvidps and addservice; it also states that ledger/handler co-location gives sensibly lower times than remote deployment.
## Methods
- Design: a blockchain-aware evolution of the OLYMPUS decentralized privacy-preserving attribute-based credential architecture, using smart contracts and a ledger-backed trust layer.
- Data/sample: a prototype/testbed with Hyperledger Fabric v2, 2 organizations with two peers each, a certification authority, an Orderer node, an Ubuntu Server 18.04 host, an Android emulator, and a OnePlus 6T device.
- Main analysis: implementation and performance evaluation of setup and query operations, including partial IdP setup, blockchain-handler methods (getvidps, getvidp, getschema, addservice, getservices, getservice), verifier/app setup, and verifiable-presentation generation and verification times.
## Limitations
- The authors state that cryptographic elements need further optimization for more limited devices (e.g., IoT devices).
- They state that smart contracts and blockchain queries should be revised to avoid excessive growth of query times, because times increase as the blockchain grows.
- Evident from the text: the service registration process is manual and requires administrators; the paper also says this could be automated in the future.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
5 Valid · 5 Not valid · 16 Not checked · 99 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The European OLYMPUS project introduces a distributed approach for IdM based on enhanced Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) that splits the role of Identity Provider to limit their in uence and chances to become a unique point of failure.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] [13] R. T. Moreno, J. Bernal Bernabe, J. Garc a Rodr guez, T. K. Frederiksen, M. Stausholm, N. Mart nez, E. Sakkopoulos, N. Ponte, and A. Skarmeta, ''The OLYMPUS architecture Oblivious identity management for private user-friendly services,'' Sensors , vol. 20, no. 3, p. 945, 2020. - source
Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“OLYMPUS provides distributed user and password-based authentication to operate (1) online or (2) of ine.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] [13] R. T. Moreno, J. Bernal Bernabe, J. Garc a Rodr guez, T. K. Frederiksen, M. Stausholm, N. Mart nez, E. Sakkopoulos, N. Ponte, and A. Skarmeta, ''The OLYMPUS architecture Oblivious identity management for private user-friendly services,'' Sensors , vol. 20, no. 3, p. 945, 2020. - source
Section 3.2 describes OLYMPUS as distributed and focused on username-and-password authentication. Sections 3.2–3.3 describe online access through distributed tokens and offline access using a previously issued P-ABC credential; offline access does not require contacting the identity providers at the time of use. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [34] [34] R. T. Moreno, J. G. Rodr guez, C. T. L pez, J. B. Bernabe, and A. Skarmeta, ''OLYMPUS: A distributed privacy-preserving identity management system,'' in Proc. Global Internet Things Summit (GIoTS) , 2020, pp. 1 6. - source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Implementations such as IBM's Identity Mixer [21], [22] or Microsoft's U-Prove [23] have not had the expected adoption rate.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [21] [21] J. Camenisch and E. Van Herreweghen, ''Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system,'' in Proc. 9th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur. , 2002, pp. 21 30. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Zerocoin contains no mention of IBM's Identity Mixer or Microsoft's U-Prove, and no statement about the adoption rate of privacy-aware attribute-based credential implementations; searched for 'Identity Mixer', 'U-Prove', 'P-ABC/anonymous credentials adoption', and 'adoption rate/deployment uptake'. The closest material is the Related Work subsection 'A. E-Cash and Bitcoin' (Chaum [30,31], Sander and Ta-Shma [35], divisible coins/wallet size [32-34]) and the Introduction/Anonymity discussion of laundry and mixing services [2,6,7] and deanonymization [3,5], none of which addresses the uptake of commercial credential systems. Anonymous credentials appear only as background citations (Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [12,38,39], Camenisch-Kohlweiss-Soriente [14], and [40] in the Conclusion) with no adoption claim attached. Since our copy does not treat the point, it neither supports nor contradicts the attributed statement. (LLM, conf=0.70)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [22] [22] J. Camenisch, S. Krenn, A. Lehmann, G. L. Mikkelsen, G. Neven, and M. O. Pedersen, ''Formal treatment of privacy-enhancing credential systems,'' in Proc. Int. Conf. Sel. Areas Cryptogr. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2015, pp. 3 24. - source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [23] [23] C. Paquin and G. Zaverucha, ''U-prove cryptographic speci cation V1. 1,'' Microsoft Corp., Albuquerque, NM, USA, Tech. Rep., 2011. [Online]. Available: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/U-Prove20Cryptographic20Speci cation20V1.1.pdf - source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Could not verify
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The proposed system has been implemented, tested, and validated, showing its performance and feasibility to manage user's identity in a fully privacy-preserving, distributed and reliable way.”
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In general, the times obtained with a deployment where ledger and Blockchain Handler are stationed in the same network are sensibly lower than those obtained with remote deployment.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
27 more claims
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Citations
Cites
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Wright, C. S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3440802 · Cited by 13,922 · cited 1×
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BackgroundBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Squarepants, S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3977007 · Cited by 11,148
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Blockchains and smart contracts for the internet of things
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“Mainly it was because of the lack of support for smart contracts [42], [43].”
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Chaum, D. L. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358549.358563 · Cited by 4,289 · cited 1×
“This paper presents a solution relying on distributed technologies and privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABC) [11], [12].”
MethodBlockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World
Tapscott, D., & Tapscott, A. (2016) · Cited by 3,679
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
Voigt, P., & von dem Bussche, A. (2017) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57959-7 · Cited by 3,001
Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Kosba, A., Miller, A., Shi, E., Wen, Z., & Papamanthou, C. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.55 · Cited by 2,227 · cited 2×
“Hawk [24], Zcash [25] or Zerocoin [26] are cryptocurrencies that already add privacy features such as zero-knowledge proofs or linkability controls.”
BackgroundMethodFormalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks
Szabo, N. (1997) · First Monday · doi:10.5210/fm.v2i9.548 · Cited by 2,102
Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Chaum, D. (1985) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/4372.4373 · Cited by 1,666 · cited 1×
“This paper presents a solution relying on distributed technologies and privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABC) [11], [12].”
Method
Research works printed but not linked: 10
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- [31] V. Dhillon, D. Metcalf, and M. Hooper, ''The hyperledger project,'' in Blockchain Enabled Application . Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2017, pp. 139 149. -
- [27] D. Khovratovich and J. Law, ''Sovrin: Digital identities in the blockchain era,'' Github Commit Jasonalaw , vol. 17, pp. 1 5, Oct. 2017. -
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- [2] L. H. Newman, Equifax Of cially Has no Excuse . San Francisco, CA, USA: Wired, 2017. -
- [20] J. Hughes and E. Maler, ''Security assertion markup language (SAML) V2. 0 technical overview,'' in Proc. OASIS SSTC Workshop Draft , 2005, pp. 29 38. -
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- [10] European Self Sovereign Identity Framework , Informatie Vlaanderen, Belgium, Jun. 2019. -
- [9] A. Tobin and D. Reed, ''The inevitable rise of self-sovereign identity,'' Sovrin Found. , vol. 29, no. 2016, 2016. -
- [44] C. Cachin, ''Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric,'' in Proc. Workshop Distrib. Cryptocurrencies Consensus Ledgers , Chicago, IL, USA, vol. 310, 2016, pp. 1 4. <!-- image --> IEEEAccess" -
Cited by
Alanzi, H. M., & Alkhatib, M. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app122312415 · Cited by 47
“…technology improved the security and privacy of IDMSs in many domains, such as IOT [12–16]; supply chain [17–20]; AC and Identity Management in [21–26], cloud IDM in [27], ad-hoc network (VANET) in [28–30], healthcare in [31–33], internet of connected vehicles in [34,35], and even for the…”
BackgroundMethodWang, Z., Yu, L., & Zhou, L. (2024) · Journal of the Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1007/s13132-024-02007-7 · Cited by 62
“These cases demonstrate how adherence to regulatory requirements and the implementation of robust trust mechanisms contribute to the successful deployment of blockchain technology (Moreno et al., 2021).”
Qualitative Survey on Artificial Intelligence Integrated Blockchain Approach for 6G and Beyond
Pathak, V., Pandya, R. J., Bhatia, V., & López, O. L. A. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3319083 · Cited by 39
Huang, C., Xu, G., Chen, S., Zhou, W., Ng, E. Y. K., & de Albuquerque, V. H. C. (2022) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2022.10.011 · Cited by 29
Blockchain-Assisted Self-Sovereign Identities on Education: A Survey
Chan, W., Gai, K., Yu, J., & Zhu, L. (2025) · Blockchains · doi:10.3390/blockchains3010003 · Cited by 45
“The fundamental requirements for identity management are to comply with three basic functions: authentication, authorization, and auditing (AAA) [49,50].”
A Systematic Literature Mapping on Using Blockchain Technology in Identity Management
Ngo, T. T. T., Dang, T. A., Huynh, V. V., & Le, T. C. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3256519 · Cited by 32
Application of the Learning Automaton Model for Ensuring Cyber Resiliency
Kalinin, M., Ovasapyan, T. D., & Poltavtseva, M. A. (2022) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym14102208 · Cited by 12
Leveraging Block chain for Secure and Decentralized Identity Management
Tabbassum, A., Chintale, P., Akiri, C., & Bhasin, N. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Distributed Systems Security (ICBDS) · doi:10.1109/icbds61829.2024.10837296 · Cited by 10
“These components are essential for establishing the validity and authenticity of digital identities within blockchain-based ecosystems, ensuring that users can trust the information exchanged in digital transactions [7].”
Saini, H., Singh, G., & Rohil, M. (2023) · International Journal of Computer Networks And Applications · doi:10.22247/ijcna/2023/223690 · Cited by 12
“These techniques seek to find a balance between facilitating data sharing and cooperation and maintaining the confidentiality and privacy of the information supplied [2].”
BackgroundBlockchain-Based Identity Management System Prototype for Enhanced Privacy and Security
Alanzi, H. M., & Alkhatib, M. (2025) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics14132605 · Cited by 10
Influence of DLT in the E-Governance Strategy
Kumar, D. K., & Beena, B. M. (2022) · International Conference on Computer, Power and Communications (ICCPC) · doi:10.1109/iccpc55978.2022.10072121 · Cited by 6
“[4][5], enhanced attribute based credentials in distributed approach for identity management similar to the European OLYMPUS (oblivious identity management for private user-friendly services) project through virtual identity providers can be used.”
BackgroundGarcía-Rodríguez, J., Krenn, S., Bernabé, J. B., & Skármeta, A. (2024) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110498 · Cited by 7
Self-citationImen, R., & Sliman, L. (2026) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi18030126 · Cited by 11
A Minimal Disclosure Signature Authentication Scheme Based on Consortium Blockchain
Yang, Z., Ma, H., Ai, M., Zhan, M., Wu, G., & Zhang, Y. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) · doi:10.1109/blockchain55522.2022.00079 · Cited by 6
“The research by Moreno et al. [15] describes the evolution of the OLYMPUS architecture, maintaining all privacy features and incorporating distributed ledger technology to enhance trust and security in online transactions and identity management systems.”
MethodPrivacy-Preserving Identity Management and Applications to Academic Degree Verification
Bernabé, J. B., García-Rodríguez, J., Krenn, S., Liagkou, V., Skármeta, A., & Torres, R. (2022) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-99100-5_4 · Cited by 5
Self-citationUnlocking Borderless Identity: B-Passport and the Blockchain Revolution
Tonoy, M. T. A., Munjal, N., Sinha, R. A., Paul, A., & Lamkuche, H. S. (2024) · IEEE International Conference for Women in Innovation, Technology & Entrepreneurship (ICWITE) · doi:10.1109/icwite59797.2024.10503329 · Cited by 4
DID:RING: Ring Signatures Using Decentralised Identifiers For Privacy-Aware Identity Proof
Kasimatis, D., Grierson, S., Buchanan, W. J., Eckl, C., Papadopoulos, P., Pitropakis, N., Chrysoulas, C., Thomson, C. J., & Ghaleb, B. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679351 · Cited by 2
“The greater the number of DIDs on the ring thus reduces the over performance of the processing.”
BackgroundHathaliya, J. J., Kumari, A., Gupta, R., Tanwar, S., Shahinzadeh, H., & Mehrabani-Najafabadi, S. (2025) · doi:10.1109/iot69654.2025.11297704 · Cited by 1
“Similarly, [8] emphasizes the importance of decentralized identity systems in empowering users to maintain control over their personal information, enhancing privacy protection.”
Chen, Y., Wang, J., Li, R., Xiong, Y., & Yang, H. (2026) · AIP Advances · doi:10.1063/5.0315097 · Cited by 1
Privacy Preserving Identity Federation: A Literature Study
Bumiller, A., Kozyri, E., & Dagenborg, H. (2026) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3745018 · Cited by 8
CACS: A Cloud Privacy-Preserving Attribute Management System
Kalu, A., Kus, B. C., Laud, P., et al. (2023) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3600160.3605022
“There exist a number of proposals for decentralized management of credentials [2, 14, 24] that may leverage blockchain technologies while still delivering privacy to users.”
BackgroundA hybrid boosted neural sensitive attribute detection machine learning algorithm for HABAC systems
Kalpana, C., & Revathy, S. (2024) · Multimedia Tools and Applications · doi:10.1007/s11042-024-18215-x
KeyHound - Identity Provider and Access Management
Pawar, P. (2024) · INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT · doi:10.55041/ijsrem30444
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Car-Sharing Systems
Malina, L., Dzurenda, P., Lővinger, N., Ekeh, I. F., & Matulevičius, R. (2024) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3664476.3670443
“In increasing the trust in car-sharing, Moreno et al. [16] stated that for users to gain trust in how information is shared within a system, the identity management system relied heavily on centralized methods of probing and mitigating risks of identity spoofing and loss of identity information.”
Embracing Decentralization: A Blockchain Database Model for Enhanced Data Operations
Sinha, R. A., Sharma, Y., Munjal, N., et al. (2024) · IEEE Region 10 Symposium (TENSYMP) · doi:10.1109/tensymp61132.2024.10752319
Blockchain identification control sparking a data protection revolution
Reddy, P. K. K., Kumar, M. V., & Raj, J. R. (2025) · AIP conference proceedings · doi:10.1063/5.0265104
Decentralized Identities in Microservice-Based Applications
Schneider, M., Priebe, A., Maurer, M., et al. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Service-Oriented System Engineering (SOSE) · doi:10.1109/sose67019.2025.00011
“Unfortunately, most centralized identity platforms have been the victims of serious data breaches that have eclipsed their best security intentions [1].”
Blockchain-Based Solution for Privacy-Preserving SIM Card Registration
Haiba, B., & Rafalia, N. (2026) · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · doi:10.3390/jcp6010030 · Cited by 1
“Systems based on DIDs, verifiable credentials, and distributed ledgers have been explored to improve integrity and user control [10,11].”
Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identity for Digital Security
Mishra, N., Chidambaram, P. K., Mahdi, H. M., Spandana, A., Karpagam, J., Neelima, P., & Gulyamova, O. S. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Green Industrial Electronics and Sustainable Technologies (GIEST) · doi:10.1109/giest66547.2025.11387509
“The blockchain-based identity solutions make use of distributed ledger technology (DLT) to protect privacy, user security, and sovereignty [9].”
Trust Management and Reputational Systems in Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT)
Kumar, S. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-6299-1.ch008
Lakkireddy, S. (2026) · Journal of Advances in Information Technology · doi:10.12720/jait.17.5.956-977 · Cited by 1
“Moreno et al. [39] presented OLYMPUS, a distributed identity management system using blockchain technology to improve privacy and trust, achieving privacy-preserving identity management through testing and validation, while identifying query time and cryptography optimization as future research…”
Platform Engineering Approaches to Automated and Secretless Secrets Management
Joyce, J. E., Kanchan, N., Padmanabha, R., et al. (2026) · International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Communication Systems (ICKECS) · doi:10.1109/ickecs70176.2026.11528076
“This study [10] decentralizes identity management for privacy and provides foundational zero-trust concepts applicable to secretless access but overlooks platform engineering scalability.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Moreno, R. T., Garcia-Rodriguez, J., Bernabe, J. B., & Skarmeta, A.
- Affiliations
- Universidad de Murcia (ES)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2021
- Volume
- 9
- Pages
- 105788-105804
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3184600253
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 6
- FWCI
- 4.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Hispana (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (786725)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Keywords
- decentralized identity management, privacy-preserving identity, attribute-based credentials, distributed ledger technology, identity spoofing, data breaches, user trust
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.