A Trusted Approach for Decentralised and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 33 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Identity Management (IdM) systems have traditionally relied on a centralized model prone to privacy, trust, and security problems, like potential massive data breaches or identity spoofing. Identity providers accumulate excessive power that might allow them to become a big brother, analyzing and storing as much data as possible. Users should be able to trust identity providers and manage their personal information straightforwardly without compromising their privacy. The European OLYMPUS project introduces a distributed approach for IdM based on enhanced Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) that splits the role of Identity Provider to limit their influence and chances to become a unique point of failure. However, the trust relationship between service providers, users, and identity providers is still a gap in those kinds of privacy-preserving ABC systems. Decentralized technologies are an opportunity to break away from the centralized model and propose systems that respect privacy while increasing users' trust. This paper presents an evolution of the OLYMPUS architecture, maintaining all the privacy features and incorporating distributed ledger technologies to enhance trust and security in online transactions and IdM systems. The proposed system has been implemented, tested, and validated, showing its performance and feasibility to manage user's identity in a fully privacy-preserving, distributed and reliable way.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper proposes a blockchain-aware extension to the OLYMPUS distributed identity-management architecture, aiming to strengthen trust while preserving privacy. It reports a prototype using Hyperledger Fabric and says the pilot deployment showed no usability penalty, while also identifying query-time growth and limited-device cryptography as future concerns.
## Key findings
- The proposed system keeps OLYMPUS privacy properties while adding a ledger as a tamper-proof registry for identity-provider and service-provider metadata, so users and services can consult registered data at any time.
- In the implementation, the authors deployed an Android user client, three Java-based partial IdPs, a JavaScript blockchain handler, and Hyperledger Fabric v2 on OpenStack.
- Partial IdP setup took between 33.43 to 36.1 seconds in the local scenario and 41.1 to 45.86 seconds in the remote scenario.
- The paper says the most expensive blockchain-handler methods are those requiring ledger searches, such as getvidps and addservice; it also states that ledger/handler co-location gives sensibly lower times than remote deployment.
## Methods
- Design: a blockchain-aware evolution of the OLYMPUS decentralized privacy-preserving attribute-based credential architecture, using smart contracts and a ledger-backed trust layer.
- Data/sample: a prototype/testbed with Hyperledger Fabric v2, 2 organizations with two peers each, a certification authority, an Orderer node, an Ubuntu Server 18.04 host, an Android emulator, and a OnePlus 6T device.
- Main analysis: implementation and performance evaluation of setup and query operations, including partial IdP setup, blockchain-handler methods (getvidps, getvidp, getschema, addservice, getservices, getservice), verifier/app setup, and verifiable-presentation generation and verification times.
## Limitations
- The authors state that cryptographic elements need further optimization for more limited devices (e.g., IoT devices).
- They state that smart contracts and blockchain queries should be revised to avoid excessive growth of query times, because times increase as the blockchain grows.
- Evident from the text: the service registration process is manual and requires administrators; the paper also says this could be automated in the future.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
5 Valid · 5 Not valid · 16 Not checked · 99 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The European OLYMPUS project introduces a distributed approach for IdM based on enhanced Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) that splits the role of Identity Provider to limit their in uence and chances to become a unique point of failure.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] [13] R. T. Moreno, J. Bernal Bernabe, J. Garc a Rodr guez, T. K. Frederiksen, M. Stausholm, N. Mart nez, E. Sakkopoulos, N. Ponte, and A. Skarmeta, ''The OLYMPUS architecture Oblivious identity management for private user-friendly services,'' Sensors , vol. 20, no. 3, p. 945, 2020. - source
Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“OLYMPUS provides distributed user and password-based authentication to operate (1) online or (2) of ine.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] [13] R. T. Moreno, J. Bernal Bernabe, J. Garc a Rodr guez, T. K. Frederiksen, M. Stausholm, N. Mart nez, E. Sakkopoulos, N. Ponte, and A. Skarmeta, ''The OLYMPUS architecture Oblivious identity management for private user-friendly services,'' Sensors , vol. 20, no. 3, p. 945, 2020. - source
Section 3.2 describes OLYMPUS as distributed and focused on username-and-password authentication. Sections 3.2–3.3 describe online access through distributed tokens and offline access using a previously issued P-ABC credential; offline access does not require contacting the identity providers at the time of use. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [34] [34] R. T. Moreno, J. G. Rodr guez, C. T. L pez, J. B. Bernabe, and A. Skarmeta, ''OLYMPUS: A distributed privacy-preserving identity management system,'' in Proc. Global Internet Things Summit (GIoTS) , 2020, pp. 1 6. - source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Implementations such as IBM's Identity Mixer [21], [22] or Microsoft's U-Prove [23] have not had the expected adoption rate.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [21] [21] J. Camenisch and E. Van Herreweghen, ''Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system,'' in Proc. 9th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur. , 2002, pp. 21 30. - sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Zerocoin contains no mention of IBM's Identity Mixer or Microsoft's U-Prove, and no statement about the adoption rate of privacy-aware attribute-based credential implementations; searched for 'Identity Mixer', 'U-Prove', 'P-ABC/anonymous credentials adoption', and 'adoption rate/deployment uptake'. The closest material is the Related Work subsection 'A. E-Cash and Bitcoin' (Chaum [30,31], Sander and Ta-Shma [35], divisible coins/wallet size [32-34]) and the Introduction/Anonymity discussion of laundry and mixing services [2,6,7] and deanonymization [3,5], none of which addresses the uptake of commercial credential systems. Anonymous credentials appear only as background citations (Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [12,38,39], Camenisch-Kohlweiss-Soriente [14], and [40] in the Conclusion) with no adoption claim attached. Since our copy does not treat the point, it neither supports nor contradicts the attributed statement. (LLM, conf=0.70)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [22] [22] J. Camenisch, S. Krenn, A. Lehmann, G. L. Mikkelsen, G. Neven, and M. O. Pedersen, ''Formal treatment of privacy-enhancing credential systems,'' in Proc. Int. Conf. Sel. Areas Cryptogr. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2015, pp. 3 24. - source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [23] [23] C. Paquin and G. Zaverucha, ''U-prove cryptographic speci cation V1. 1,'' Microsoft Corp., Albuquerque, NM, USA, Tech. Rep., 2011. [Online]. Available: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/U-Prove20Cryptographic20Speci cation20V1.1.pdf - source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Could not verify
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The proposed system has been implemented, tested, and validated, showing its performance and feasibility to manage user's identity in a fully privacy-preserving, distributed and reliable way.”
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In general, the times obtained with a deployment where ledger and Blockchain Handler are stationed in the same network are sensibly lower than those obtained with remote deployment.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Wright, C. S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3440802 · Cited by 13,922 · cited 1×
“Although the popularity of these technologies is due to the irruption of Bitcoin [7] and other cryptocurrencies, their application has been demonstrated in other cases such as border control, e-voting, e-residence, authorship management, supply chains, etc.”
BackgroundBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Squarepants, S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3977007 · Cited by 11,148
(2013) · Cited by 5,372
Blockchains and smart contracts for the internet of things
Christidis, K., & Devetsikiotis, M. (2016) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2016.2566339 · Cited by 4,552 · cited 1×
“Mainly it was because of the lack of support for smart contracts [42], [43].”
BackgroundUntraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Chaum, D. L. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358549.358563 · Cited by 4,289 · cited 1×
“This paper presents a solution relying on distributed technologies and privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABC) [11], [12].”
MethodBlockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World
Tapscott, D., & Tapscott, A. (2016) · Cited by 3,679
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
Voigt, P., & von dem Bussche, A. (2017) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57959-7 · Cited by 3,001
Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Kosba, A., Miller, A., Shi, E., Wen, Z., & Papamanthou, C. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.55 · Cited by 2,227 · cited 2×
“Hawk [24], Zcash [25] or Zerocoin [26] are cryptocurrencies that already add privacy features such as zero-knowledge proofs or linkability controls.”
BackgroundMethodFormalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks
Szabo, N. (1997) · First Monday · doi:10.5210/fm.v2i9.548 · Cited by 2,102
Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Chaum, D. (1985) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/4372.4373 · Cited by 1,666 · cited 1×
“This paper presents a solution relying on distributed technologies and privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (P-ABC) [11], [12].”
MethodThe OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
(2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6749 · Cited by 1,383 · cited 1×
“They are based on protocols and standards, such as OAuth [19] or SAML [20].”
MethodAn Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
Camenisch, J., & Lysyanskaya, A. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44987-6_7 · Cited by 1,321
Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin
Miers, I., Garman, C., Green, M., & Rubin, A. D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.34 · Cited by 983 · cited 1×
“Hawk [24], Zcash [25] or Zerocoin [26] are cryptocurrencies that already add privacy features such as zero-knowledge proofs or linkability controls.”
BackgroundInternet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., & Solo, D. (1999) · doi:10.17487/rfc2459 · Cited by 837 · cited 2×
“Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [14] and the use of X.509 certificates is one of the best-known and easy-to-implement solutions.”
BackgroundPerformance Benchmarking and Optimizing Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Platform
Thakkar, P., Nathan, S., & Viswanathan, B. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 26th International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (MASCOTS) · doi:10.1109/mascots.2018.00034 · Cited by 632 · cited 1×
“In addition, the scalability and efficiency of Fab-ric have already been analyzed in several studies [45], [46] with promising results, such as the possibility of handling 200 transactions per second and more than 100,000 participants with an average response time of 0.01 seconds for 100,000…”
BackgroundInfluentialPerformance Benchmarking and Optimizing Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Platform
Thakkar, P., Nathan, S., & Viswanathan, B. (2018) · IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation On Computer and Telecommunication Systems · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1805.11390 · Cited by 560
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Camenisch, J., & Van Herreweghen, E. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586114 · Cited by 555 · cited 3×
“Implementations such as IBM’s Identity Mixer [21], [22] or Microsoft’s U-Prove [23] have not had the expected adoption rate.”
MethodPrivacy-Preserving Solutions for Blockchain: Review and Challenges
Bernal Bernabe, J., Canovas, J. L., Hernandez-Ramos, J. L., Torres Moreno, R., & Skarmeta, A. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2950872 · Cited by 459 · cited 3×
“Distributed technologies are emerging strongly, and applications such as Blockchain are taking identity systems to a new level where privacy and security are the challenges to address [8].”
BackgroundSelf-citationKuzlu, M., Pipattanasomporn, M., Gurses, L., & Rahman, S. (2019) · 2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) · doi:10.1109/blockchain.2019.00003 · Cited by 279 · cited 1×
“01 seconds for 100,000 ‘‘query’’ transactions requests [47].”
Performance Modeling of Hyperledger Fabric (Permissioned Blockchain Network)
Sukhwani, H., Wang, N., Trivedi, K. S., & Rindos, A. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA) · doi:10.1109/nca.2018.8548070 · Cited by 203
Distributed ledger technology: Applications and implications
Maull, R., Godsiff, P., Mulligan, C. E. A., Brown, A. J., & Kewell, B. (2017) · Strategic Change · doi:10.1002/jsc.2148 · Cited by 189 · cited 1×
“The metamorphosis of Internet services and the quest for greater security have brought distributed ledger technologies(DLT) [5] to the forefront.”
BackgroundDesign and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Camenisch, J., & Van Herreweghen, E. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586111.586114 · Cited by 169
Dhillon, V., Metcalf, D. H., & Hooper, M. (2017) · Apress eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4842-3081-7_10 · Cited by 162 · cited 2×
“Among the available options, those based on the Hyperledger [31] project have been considered.”
BackgroundClercq, J. D. (2002) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45831-x_4 · Cited by 148 · cited 10×
“Nevertheless, the main benefit of SSO over X.509 is applying a high level of granularity to user attributes.”
BackgroundInfluentialPotential Risks of Hyperledger Fabric Smart Contracts
Yamashita, K., Nomura, Y., Zhou, E., Pi, B., & Jun, S. (2019) · 2019 IEEE International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering (IWBOSE) · doi:10.1109/iwbose.2019.8666486 · Cited by 131 · cited 1×
“Works such as Brotsis et al. [48], Andola et al. [49], Yamashita et al. [50], and Dabholkar et al. [51] have already dealt with security analysis of HLF, including common attacks and problems (i.e., DDoS attacks, double registration problem or tampering), structural challenges and possible problems…”
BackgroundOn the Security and Privacy of Hyperledger Fabric: Challenges and Open Issues
Brotsis, S., Kolokotronis, N., Limniotis, K., Bendiab, G., & Shiaeles, S. N. (2020) · IEEE World Congress on Services (SERVICES) · doi:10.1109/services48979.2020.00049 · Cited by 93 · cited 1×
“Works such as Brotsis et al. [48], Andola et al. [49], Yamashita et al. [50], and Dabholkar et al. [51] have already dealt with security analysis of HLF, including common attacks and problems (i.e., DDoS attacks, double registration problem or tampering), structural challenges and possible problems…”
BackgroundFormal Treatment of Privacy-Enhancing Credential Systems
Camenisch, J., Krenn, S., Lehmann, A., Mikkelsen, G. L., Neven, G., & Pedersen, M. Ø. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_1 · Cited by 65 · cited 1×
“Implementations such as IBM’s Identity Mixer [21], [22] or Microsoft’s U-Prove [23] have not had the expected adoption rate.”
MethodVulnerabilities on Hyperledger Fabric
Andola, N., Raghav, Gogoi, M., Venkatesan, S., & Verma, S. (2019) · Pervasive and Mobile Computing · doi:10.1016/j.pmcj.2019.101050 · Cited by 65
Short Threshold Dynamic Group Signatures
Camenisch, J., Drijvers, M., Lehmann, A., Neven, G., & Towa, P. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_20 · Cited by 59 · cited 2×
“Thesecurityof the user identity during interactions is assured through the properties of the P-ABC scheme [38].”
MethodPESTO: Proactively Secure Distributed Single Sign-On, or How to Trust a Hacked Server
Baum, C., Frederiksen, T., Hesse, J., Lehmann, A., & Yanai, A. (2020) · 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00044 · Cited by 49
Ripping the Fabric: Attacks and Mitigations on Hyperledger Fabric
Dabholkar, A., & Saraswat, V. (2019) · Communications in Computer and Information Science · doi:10.1007/978-981-15-0871-4_24 · Cited by 42
An Architecture for Privacy-ABCs
Bichsel, P., Camenisch, J., Dubovitskaya, M., Enderlein, R. R., Krenn, S., Krontiris, I., Lehmann, A., Neven, G., Paquin, C., Preiss, F.-S., et al. (2015) · Attribute-based Credentials for Trust · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-14439-9_2 · Cited by 17 · cited 2×
“Beyond the typical username and password, other solutions try to increase privacy and security, such as public key infrastructures (PKI) [14], single sign-on (SSO) [15], or privacy-enhancing attribute-based credentials (P-ABC) [16]–[18] that we briefly introduce below.”
BackgroundThe OLYMPUS Architecture—Oblivious Identity Management for Private User-Friendly Services
Torres Moreno, R., Bernal Bernabe, J., García Rodríguez, J., Kasper Frederiksen, T., Stausholm, M., Martínez, N., Sakkopoulos, E., Ponte, N., & Skarmeta, A. (2020) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s20030945 · Cited by 15 · cited 3×
“The European project OLYMPUS [13], [34], introduces a new proposal for identity management applying distributed techniques, intending to solve the problems presented in previous solutions.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationOLYMPUS: towards Oblivious identitY Management for Private and User-friendly Services
Moreno, R. T., Bernabé, J. B., Skármeta, A., Stausholm, M. B., Frederiksen, T. K., Martínez, N., Ponte, N. S., Sakkopoulos, E., & Lehmann, A. (2019) · Global Internet of Things Summit (GIoTS) · doi:10.1109/giots.2019.8766357 · Cited by 12
Self-citationOLYMPUS: A distributed privacy-preserving identity management system
Moreno, R. T., Rodriguez, J. G., Lopez, C. T., Bernabe, J. B., & Skarmeta, A. (2020) · 2020 Global Internet of Things Summit (GIoTS) · doi:10.1109/giots49054.2020.9119663 · Cited by 7 · cited 2×
“The European project OLYMPUS [13], [34], introduces a”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationRannenberg, K., Tesfay, W., & Sabouri, A. (2015) · Attribute-based Credentials for Trust · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-14439-9_1
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Cited by
Alanzi, H. M., & Alkhatib, M. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app122312415 · Cited by 47
“…technology improved the security and privacy of IDMSs in many domains, such as IOT [12–16]; supply chain [17–20]; AC and Identity Management in [21–26], cloud IDM in [27], ad-hoc network (VANET) in [28–30], healthcare in [31–33], internet of connected vehicles in [34,35], and even for the…”
BackgroundMethodWang, Z., Yu, L., & Zhou, L. (2024) · Journal of the Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1007/s13132-024-02007-7 · Cited by 62
“These cases demonstrate how adherence to regulatory requirements and the implementation of robust trust mechanisms contribute to the successful deployment of blockchain technology (Moreno et al., 2021).”
Qualitative Survey on Artificial Intelligence Integrated Blockchain Approach for 6G and Beyond
Pathak, V., Pandya, R. J., Bhatia, V., & López, O. L. A. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3319083 · Cited by 39
Huang, C., Xu, G., Chen, S., Zhou, W., Ng, E. Y. K., & de Albuquerque, V. H. C. (2022) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2022.10.011 · Cited by 29
Blockchain-Assisted Self-Sovereign Identities on Education: A Survey
Chan, W., Gai, K., Yu, J., & Zhu, L. (2025) · Blockchains · doi:10.3390/blockchains3010003 · Cited by 45
“The fundamental requirements for identity management are to comply with three basic functions: authentication, authorization, and auditing (AAA) [49,50].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Moreno, R. T., Garcia-Rodriguez, J., Bernabe, J. B., & Skarmeta, A.
- Affiliations
- Universidad de Murcia (ES)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2021
- Volume
- 9
- Pages
- 105788-105804
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3184600253
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 6
- FWCI
- 4.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Hispana (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (786725)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Keywords
- decentralized identity management, privacy-preserving identity, attribute-based credentials, distributed ledger technology, identity spoofing, data breaches, user trust
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