Cited by 19Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningTopic ModelingSecurity and Verification in Computing

A Systematic Review of Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models: Trends, Taxonomy, Evaluation, Defenses, and Opportunities

Open access
Damacena Duarte, Jaqueline, Cândido, Guilherme D., De Britto Filho, José Ricardo A., Souza Neto, João, Da Costa, Elena J., Da Costa, João Paulo Javidi, Peotta De Melo, Laerte·2026·IEEE Access

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into various infrastructure and interactive applications. However, their inherent linguistic flexibility introduces security vulnerabilities, particularly through Prompt Injection (PI) attacks. This systematic review provides a comprehensive synthesis of the evolving landscape of PI attacks, including their development trends, classification schemes, evaluation methodologies, defense strategies, and areas for future research. We analyze the evolution of attacks from basic natural language overrides to complex multi-turn manipulations, indirect injections using structured formats such as JSON and XML, and tool-assisted exploits involving automated prompt generation and multi-modal inputs like images. PI attacks are categorized by the level of manipulation, including character, word, sentence, and semantic levels, and by adversarial intent, such as prompt leaking and harmful content generation. The study analyzes these techniques within different LLM architectures and application contexts, including machine translation and Chain of Thought reasoning. It also reviews common evaluation benchmarks, datasets, and metrics. Mitigation strategies examined include automated red teaming frameworks, input validation, content filtering, and alignment through training. It differentiates itself from previous works by conducting a systematic review specifically focused on immediate injection, organizing its attacks, defenses and resear…

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Crossref · 10.1109/access.2026.3656849

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  • Adversarial strategies have shifted from basic natural language overrides to highly sophisticated, multi-stage indirect injections that exploit structured formats and integrated tools.

    “The threat landscape has evolved rapidly; adversarial strategies have shifted from basic natural language overrides to highly sophisticated, multi-stage indirect injections that exploit structured formats and integrated tools [6].”

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Authors
Damacena Duarte, J., Cândido, G. D., De Britto Filho, J. R. A., Souza Neto, J., Da Costa, E. J., Da Costa, J. P. J., & Peotta De Melo, L.
Affiliations
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Brasília, Brasília, Brazil
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2026
Volume
14
Pages
12875-12899
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7125497551
Cited by
15
References
55
Citations by year
2026: 15
FWCI
14.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
prompt injection, large language models, LLM security, attack taxonomy, harmful content generation, defense strategy, input validation, content filtering, alignment training, LLM safety, machine translation, chain-of-thought reasoning

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