Cited by 77Digital Media Forensic DetectionAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningGenerative Adversarial Networks and Image Synthesis

Evading DeepFake Detectors via Adversarial Statistical Consistency

Open access
Hou, Yang, Guo, Qing, Huang, Yihao, Xie, Xiaofei, Ma, Lei, Zhao, Jianjun·2023·2023 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)

Abstract

In recent years, as various realistic face forgery techniques known as DeepFake improves by leaps and bounds, more and more DeepFake detection techniques have been proposed. These methods typically rely on detecting statistical differences between natural (i.e., real) and DeepFake-generated images in both spatial and frequency domains. In this work, we propose to explicitly minimize the statistical differences to evade state-of-the-art DeepFake detectors. To this end, we propose a statistical consistency attack (StatAttack) against DeepFake detectors, which contains two main parts. First, we select several statistical-sensitive natural degradations (i.e., exposure, blur, and noise) and add them to the fake images in an adversarial way. Second, we find that the statistical differences between natural and DeepFake images are positively associated with the distribution shifting between the two kinds of images, and we propose to use a distribution-aware loss to guide the optimization of different degradations. As a result, the feature distributions of generated adversarial examples is close to the natural images. Furthermore, we extend the StatAttack to a more powerful version, MStatAttack, where we extend the single-layer degradation to multi-layer degradations sequentially and use the loss to tune the combination weights jointly. Comprehensive experimental results on four spatial-based detectors and two frequency-based detectors with four datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack method in both white-box and black-box settings.

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  • None of the existing datasets incorporate adversarially perturbed deepfakes designed to evade detection.

    “None of the existing datasets incorporate adversarially perturbed DFs designed to evade detection, which is a critical real-world threat [17, 21].”

    From Deepfake detection across image, video, and audio: a comprehensive survey with empirical evaluation of generalization and robustness (2026) · cites this paper as [21]

    The Introduction says transferable adversarial examples pose a practical threat to DeepFake detection. Section 6.1 describes the datasets used in the experiments, but neither it nor the other passages establishes that no existing dataset contains adversarially perturbed deepfakes. The categorical dataset claim is therefore unsupported by this paper. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • DF detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which introduce carefully crafted perturbations into DF content to deceive detection systems while remaining imperceptible to humans.

    “DF detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which introduce carefully crafted perturbations into DF content to deceive detection systems while remaining imperceptible to humans.”

    From Deepfake detection across image, video, and audio: a comprehensive survey with empirical evaluation of generalization and robustness (2026) · cites this paper as [21]

    The Introduction says adversarial perturbations can bypass DeepFake detectors, and §6.4 reports that the paper's attacks maintain image quality and produce natural-looking examples. The copy does not establish that the perturbations are imperceptible to humans or that detector vulnerability is increasing over time. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Existing surveys do not examine how detection methods withstand adversarial attacks designed to evade detection or postprocessing operations that degrade detection performance.

    “Existing surveys do not examine how detection methods withstand adversarial attacks designed to evade detection [17, 21] or postprocessing operations that degrade detection performance [22-24].”
  • Recent studies have demonstrated that even SoTA detection models can be significantly compromised by adversarial examples.

    “Recent studies have demonstrated that even SoTA detection models can be significantly compromised by adversarial examples (AEs) [21, 197-199].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In Interna- tional Conference on Learning Representations, 2015. 3
  2. Justus Thies, Michael Zollhöfer, and Matthias Nießner. De- ferred neural rendering: Image synthesis using neural textures. ACM Transactions on Graphics (TOG), 38(4):1-12, 2019. 1
  3. Liming Zhai, Qing Guo, Xiaofei Xie, Lei Ma, Yi Estelle Wang, and Yang Liu. A3gan: Attribute-aware anonymization networks for face de-identification. In Proceedings of the 30th ACM International Conference on Multimedia, pages 5303-5313, 2022. 2

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Authors
Hou, Y., Guo, Q., Huang, Y., Xie, X., Ma, L., & Zhao, J.
Affiliations
  • Kyushu University (JP)
  • Agency for Science, Technology and Research (SG)
  • Nanyang Technological University (SG)
  • Singapore Management University (SG)
  • University of Alberta (CA)
Venue
2023 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-06
Pages
12271-12280
ISSN
1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4386071537
Cited by
76
References
51
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 4
FWCI
8.13
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
  • Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JPMJSP2136, 20H04168, 21H04877)
  • JST-Mirai Program (JPMJSP 2136, JPMJMI20B8)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Generative Adversarial Networks and Image Synthesis
Keywords
adversarial attacks, statistical consistency, face forgery, distribution shift, image degradation, adversarial examples, white-box and black-box attacks

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