Cited by 117Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic DetectionMisinformation and Its Impacts

Adversarial Threats to DeepFake Detection: A Practical Perspective

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Neekhara, Paarth, Dolhansky, Brian, Bitton, Joanna, Ferrer, Cristian Canton·2021·2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)

Abstract

Facially manipulated images and videos or DeepFakes can be used maliciously to fuel misinformation or defame individuals. Therefore, detecting DeepFakes is crucial to increase the credibility of social media platforms and other media sharing web sites. State-of-the art DeepFake detection techniques rely on neural network based classification models which are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. In this work, we study the vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art DeepFake detection methods from a practical stand point. We perform adversarial attacks on DeepFake detectors in a black box setting where the adversary does not have complete knowledge of the classification models. We study the extent to which adversarial perturbations transfer across different models and propose techniques to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. We also create more accessible attacks using Universal Adversarial Perturbations which pose a very feasible attack scenario since they can be easily shared amongst attackers. We perform our evaluations on the winning entries of the DeepFake Detection Challenge (DFDC) and demonstrate that they can be easily bypassed in a practical attack scenario by designing transferable and accessible adversarial attacks.1

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  • Frequency-based and blending-artifact methods are vulnerable to quality impairment and adversarial attacks.

    “While these solutions provide some more insight on the type of manipulation performed, they are also very vulnerable to all quality impairment actions that disguise the low-level features they rely upon. These include not only casual image impairment processes, but also voluntary perturbations and adversarial attacks [27, 45] which are becoming more and more commonplace.”

    From Audio-Visual Person-of-Interest DeepFake Detection (2023) · cites this paper as [45]

    Sections 3.3 and 4.3 report successful adversarial attacks against the DeepFake detectors studied, supporting the adversarial-attack portion of the claim. Our copy does not establish that frequency-based or blending-artifact methods specifically are vulnerable, or that ordinary quality impairment defeats them; Section 3.4 uses resizing and noise to test the robustness of attacks, not to demonstrate those impairments defeat detectors. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • DF detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which introduce carefully crafted perturbations into DF content to deceive detection systems while remaining imperceptible to humans.

    “DF detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which introduce carefully crafted perturbations into DF content to deceive detection systems while remaining imperceptible to humans.”

    From Deepfake detection across image, video, and audio: a comprehensive survey with empirical evaluation of generalization and robustness (2026) · cites this paper as [199]

    The Abstract reports that adversarial attacks can bypass DeepFake detectors, and §4.3 (page unavailable) describes successful attacks with perturbations that are visually fairly imperceptible. The paper does not establish that detectors are becoming increasingly vulnerable over time; §4.4 also notes that some successful universal perturbations are more perceptible. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Neekhara et al. (2021) provided a practical perspective focusing on adversarial threats to DeepFake detection; by studying commonalities between detection methods using gradient-based saliency maps, they can create adversarial examples highly transferable across different DeepFake detection methods, revealing vulnerabilities of DeepFake detectors.

    “Neekhara et al. (2021) provided a practical perspective that focuses on the adversarial threats to DeepFake detection. By studying the commonalities between various DeepFake detection methods by interpreting the model decisions using gradient-based saliency maps, the authors can create adversarial examples that are highly transferable across different DeepFake detection methods, revealing the”

    From Countering Malicious DeepFakes: Survey, Battleground, and Horizon (2022) · cites this paper as Neekhara et al. (2021)

  • Neekhara et al. (2021) find that input-preprocessing steps and face detection methods across DeepFake detectors make adversarial transferability difficult.

    “Neekhara et al. (2021) further study the adversarial attack-based evasion methods on the more challenging DeepFake Detection Challenge (DFDC) dataset (Dolhansky et al. 2020) and find that the input-preprocessing steps, as well as face detection methods across DeepFake detectors, make the adversarial transferability difficult.”

    From Countering Malicious DeepFakes: Survey, Battleground, and Horizon (2022) · cites this paper as Neekhara et al. 2021

  • Deep learning-based deepfake detectors are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, with detection performance degrading sharply even in black-box scenarios.

    “It is also worth pointing out that deep learning-based methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks with detection performance that degrades sharply even in a black-box scenario [13,27,45].”

    From Audio-Visual Person-of-Interest DeepFake Detection (2023) · cites this paper as [45]

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. Delving into transferable adversarial examples and black- box attacks. In International Conference on Learning Rep- resentations (ICLR), 2017. 3
  2. Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Universal adversarial perturba- tions. In Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recog- nition (CVPR), 2017. 3, 5
  3. Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. Prac- tical black-box attacks against machine learning. In ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Se- curity, 2017. 3
  4. Dawn Song, Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernan- des, Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Florian Tramèr, Atul Prakash, and Tadayoshi Kohno. Physical adversarial examples for object detectors. In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, 2018. 3
  5. J.T. Springenberg, A. Dosovitskiy, T. Brox, and M. Ried- miller. Striving for simplicity: The all convolutional net. In International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015. 2
  6. Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. In- triguing properties of neural networks. In International Con- ference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2014. 1, 3
  7. Wen Zhou, Xin Hou, Yongjun Chen, Mengyun Tang, Xi- angqi Huang, Xiang Gan, and Yong Yang. Transferable ad- versarial perturbations. In European Conference on Com- puter Vision (ECCV), pages 452-467, 2018.

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Authors
Neekhara, P., Dolhansky, B., Bitton, J., & Ferrer, C. C.
Affiliations
University of California San Diego (US)
Venue
2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-06
Pages
923-932
OpenAlex
W3101239181
Cited by
117
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 7 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
8.20
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
Keywords
deepfake detection, adversarial attacks, black-box attacks, adversarial example transferability, universal adversarial perturbations, face manipulation, misinformation, DFDC, neural network vulnerabilities, social media credibility

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