Efficient Group-Key Management for Low-bandwidth Smart Grid Networks
Abstract
As Smart Grid comes with new smart devices and additional data collection for improved control decisions, this puts a lot of burden on the underlying legacy communication infrastructures that may be severely limited in bandwidth. Therefore, an alternative is to consider publish-subscribe architectures for not only enabling flexible communication options but also exploiting multicasting capabilities to reduce the number of data messages transmitted. However, this capability needs to be complemented by a communication-efficient group key management scheme that will ensure security of multicast messages in terms of confidentiality, integrity and authentication. In this paper, we propose a group-key generation and renewal mechanism that minimizes the number of messages while still following the Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key exchange. Specifically, the Control Center (CC) utilizes Shamir's secret key sharing scheme to compute points for each device using random pairs sent by group members. Such points are then utilized to derive the group key based on Lagrange interpolation. The hash-chain concept is employed to renew the group key without requiring further message exchanges, essentially achieving key renewal in a single message. We evaluated our protocol by creating an MQTT-based testbed supporting multicasting. The results show that number of messages are decreased significantly compared to alternative approaches.
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Although current ransomware campaigns do not target CPS, the installation of more intelligent electronic devices in the field by CI makes CI and its CPS a more likely target for ransomware; as smart technologies expand, they will become a growing target; thus, ransomware targeting industrial CPS intelligent electronic devices will become more prevalent.
“Although current ransomware campaigns do not target CPS, the installation of more intelligent electronic devices in the field by CI makes the CI and its CPS a more likely target for ransomware. As smart technologies continue to expand and integrate into homes, transportation, buildings, and throughout cities, they will become a growing target in the future development of ransomware that targets”
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Retracted
- Authors
- Hanna, Y., Cebe, M., Mercan, S., & Akkaya, K.
- Affiliations
- Florida International University (US)
- Marquette University (US)
- Venue
- 2021 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2021-10-25
- Pages
- 188-193
- OpenAlex
- W4200191163
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 2.61
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- USAID (1004242-S21-35022-00)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Keywords
- group key management, smart grid, low-bandwidth communication, multicast security, publish-subscribe architecture, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Shamir secret sharing, Lagrange interpolation, hash chains, key renewal, MQTT, communication efficiency
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