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Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
Open accessAbstract
Civitas is the first electronic voting system that is coercion-resistant, universally and voter verifiable, and suitable for remote voting. This paper describes the design and implementation of Civitas. Assurance is established in the design through security proofs, and in the implementation through information-flow security analysis. Experimental results give a quantitative evaluation of the tradeoffs between time, cost, and security.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Clarkson, M. R., Chong, S., & Myers, A. C.
- Venue
- 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2008-05
- Pages
- 354-368
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2148791173
- Cited by
- 397
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 19.85
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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