The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
HomeAlone: Co-residency Detection in the Cloud via Side-Channel Analysis
Abstract
Security is a major barrier to enterprise adoption of cloud computing. Physical co-residency with other tenants poses a particular risk, due to pervasive virtualization in the cloud. Recent research has shown how side channels in shared hardware may enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data across virtual machines (VMs). In view of such risks, cloud providers may promise physically isolated resources to select tenants, but a challenge remains: Tenants still need to be able to verify physical isolation of their VMs. We introduce Home Alone, a system that lets a tenant verify its VMs' exclusive use of a physical machine. The key idea in Home Alone is to invert the usual application of side channels. Rather than exploiting a side channel as a vector of attack, Home Alone uses a side-channel (in the L2 memory cache) as a novel, defensive detection tool. By analyzing cache usage during periods in which "friendly" VMs coordinate to avoid portions of the cache, a tenant using Home Alone can detect the activity of a co-resident "foe" VM. Key technical contributions of Home Alone include classification techniques to analyze cache usage and guest operating system kernel modifications that minimize the performance impact of friendly VMs sidestepping monitored cache portions. Home Alone requires no modification of existing hyper visors and no special action or cooperation by the cloud provider.
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Citations
Cites
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
Kocher, P. C. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9 · Cited by 4,387
The PARSEC benchmark suite: characterization and architectural implications
Bienia, C., Kumar, S., Singh, J. P., & Li, K. (2008) · Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Parallel architectures and compilation techniques · doi:10.1145/1454115.1454128 · Cited by 3,444
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653687 · Cited by 2,053
New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks
Wang, Z., & Lee, R. B. (2007) · Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture · doi:10.1145/1250662.1250723 · Cited by 500
Efficient Cache Attacks on AES, and Countermeasures
Tromer, E., Osvik, D. A., & Shamir, A. (2010) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-009-9049-y · Cited by 444
Cache-Collision Timing Attacks Against AES
Bonneau, J., & Mironov, I. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11894063_16 · Cited by 367
Predicting Secret Keys Via Branch Prediction
Acıiçmez, O., Koç, Ç. K., & Seifert, J.-P. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11967668_15 · Cited by 307
Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture
Wang, Z., & Lee, R. (2006) · 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06) · doi:10.1109/acsac.2006.20 · Cited by 270
Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM
Käsper, E., & Schwabe, P. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_1 · Cited by 265
On the power of simple branch prediction analysis
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Cited by
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G., & Lee, R. B. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.43 · Cited by 1,009
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382230 · Cited by 787
Self-citationPractical Timing Side Channel Attacks against Kernel Space ASLR
Hund, R., Willems, C., & Holz, T. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.23 · Cited by 393
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660356 · Cited by 327
Self-citationCacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies the Power of Cache Attacks
Moghimi, A., Irazoqui, G., & Eisenbarth, T. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_4 · Cited by 237
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Oprea, A., & Reiter, M. K.
- Venue
- 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-05
- Pages
- 313-328
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2169461225
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 19.09
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Oprea, A., & Reiter, M. K. (2011). HomeAlone: Co-residency Detection in the Cloud via Side-Channel Analysis. 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2011.31
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