The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization
Open accessAbstract
Fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) has recently been proposed as a method of efficiently mitigating runtime attacks. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of a framework based on a novel attack strategy, dubbed just-in-time code reuse, that undermines the benefits of fine-grained ASLR. Specifically, we derail the assumptions embodied in fine-grained ASLR by exploiting the ability to repeatedly abuse a memory disclosure to map an application's memory layout on-the-fly, dynamically discover API functions and gadgets, and JIT-compile a target program using those gadgets -- all within a script environment at the time an exploit is launched. We demonstrate the power of our framework by using it in conjunction with a real-world exploit against Internet Explorer, and also provide extensive evaluations that demonstrate the practicality of just-in-time code reuse attacks. Our findings suggest that fine-grained ASLR may not be as promising as first thought.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Snow, K. Z., Monrose, F., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Liebchen, C., & Sadeghi, A.
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-05
- Pages
- 574-588
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1963947298
- Cited by
- 505
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 36.64
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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