Cited by 37Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

BayBFed: Bayesian Backdoor Defense for Federated Learning

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Kumari, Kavita, Rieger, Phillip, Fereidooni, Hossein, Jadliwala, Murtuza, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza·2023·2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging technology that allows participants to jointly train a machine learning model without sharing their private data with others. However, FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks such as backdoor attacks. Consequently, a variety of defenses have recently been proposed, which have primarily utilized intermediary states of the global model (i.e., logits) or distance of the local models (i.e., L2−norm) with respect to the global model to detect malicious backdoors in FL. However, as these approaches directly operate on client updates (or weights), their effectiveness depends on factors such as clients’ data distribution or the adversary’s attack strategies. In this paper, we introduce a novel and more generic backdoor defense framework, called BayBFed, which proposes to utilize probability distributions over client updates to detect malicious updates in FL: BayBFed computes a probabilistic measure over the clients’ updates to keep track of any adjustments made in the updates, and uses a novel detection algorithm that can leverage this probabilistic measure to efficiently detect and filter out malicious updates. Thus, it overcomes the shortcomings of previous approaches that arise due to the direct usage of client updates; nevertheless, our probabilistic measure will include all aspects of the local client training strategies. BayBFed utilizes two Bayesian NonParametric (BNP) extensions: (i) a Hierarchical Beta-Bernoulli process to draw a probabilistic measure given the clients’ updates, and (ii) an adaptation of the Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP), referred by us as CRP-Jensen, which leverages this probabilistic measure to detect and filter out malicious updates. We extensively evaluate our defense approach on five benchmark datasets: CIFAR10, Reddit, IoT intrusion detection, MNIST, and FMNIST, and show that it can effectively detect and eliminate malicious updates in FL without deteriorating the benign performance of the global model.

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Crossref · 10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179362

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Cited by

Authors
Kumari, K., Rieger, P., Fereidooni, H., Jadliwala, M., & Sadeghi, A.-R.
Affiliations
  • Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
  • The University of Texas at San Antonio (US)
Venue
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-05
Pages
737-754
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4385679828
Cited by
37
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 4
FWCI
6.56
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
  • TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
National Science Foundation (1943351)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
federated learning, backdoor attacks, backdoor detection, poisoning attacks, Chinese restaurant process

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