A Model-Based Approach to Predicting the Performance of Insider Threat Detection Systems
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent high profile security breaches have highlighted the importance of insider threat detection systems for cybersecurity. However, issues such as high false positive rates and concerns over data privacy make it difficult to predict performance within an enterprise environment. These and other issues limit an organization's ability to effectively apply these tools. In this paper, we present an approach to predicting the performance of insider threat detection systems that leverages enterprise-level modeling. We provide a proof of concept of our modeling approach by applying it to a synthetic dataset and comparing its predictions to the ground truth. The results shown here to predict performance can enable enterprises to compare tools and ultimately allow them to make better informed decisions about which insider threat detection systems to deploy.
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Citations
Cites
Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.37 · Cited by 344 · cited 2×
“In our work, we make use of a synthetic dataset of user behavior, generated by CERT [6], into which insiders were injected.”
MethodDetecting Insider Threat from Enterprise Social and Online Activity Data
Gavai, G., Sricharan, K., Gunning, D., Rolleston, R., Hanley, J., & Singhal, M. (2015) · Proceedings of the 7th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats · doi:10.1145/2808783.2808784 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“…some of these efforts have been entirely conceptual (e.g. [7]), others have included proof-of-concept evaluation methods involving metrics such as confusion matrices [4] [5] [8], receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves [5] [9] [8], and loss functions [10] to characterize detection accuracy.”
BackgroundMethods and Metrics for Evaluating Analytic Insider Threat Tools
Greitzer, F. L., & Ferryman, T. A. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.34 · Cited by 22
Cited by
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
Analyzing Data Granularity Levels for Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning
Le, D. C., Zincir-Heywood, N., & Heywood, M. I. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2020.2967721 · Cited by 191
“Capabilities of different ML techniques, such as decision tree [27], Bayesian-based approaches [31], [32], and self-organizing map [26] were also examined for insider threat detection.”
MethodTechniques and countermeasures for preventing insider threats
Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T. (2022) · PeerJ Computer Science · doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.938 · Cited by 45
“It is noticed that most of the existing approaches focused on the first class ‘‘detection approaches’’, such as in Alsowail & Al-Shehari (2020) , Roberts et al. (2016) , Chen, Nyemba & Malin (2012) , Gates et al. (2014) , Axelrad et al. (2013) , Legg et al. (2017) , Raissi-Dehkordi & Carr (2011)…”
BackgroundMethodEmpirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents
Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2989739 · Cited by 41
Al-Shehari, T., & Alsowail, R. A. (2023) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-022-00651-1 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Roberts, S. C., Holodnak, J. T., Nguyen, T., Yuditskaya, S., Milosavljevic, M., & Streilein, W. W.
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-05
- Pages
- 314-323
- OpenAlex
- W2493819142
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 0.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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