The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
Open accessAbstract
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome model,” dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the “substitute model,” insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
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Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Self-citationInvestor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Self-citationThe Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
Self-citationFinancial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
The Diversity of Modern Capitalism
Amable, B. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019926113x.001.0001 · Cited by 1,930
Metadata
- Authors
- La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-33
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2891389313
- Cited by
- 3,174
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 105.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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