The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent‐Seeking and Inefficient Investment
Abstract
We develop a two‐tiered agency model that shows how rent‐seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent‐seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of “socialism” in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.
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Citations
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CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
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Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2537-2564
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3125062060
- Cited by
- 1,551
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 217.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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