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Cited by 395

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device

Open access
Carrillo, Juan D., Mariotti, Thomas·2000·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra-personal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs.

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Metadata

Authors
Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2000-07
Volume
67
Issue
3
Pages
529-544
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W2050290869
Cited by
395
References
22
FWCI
19.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-937x.00142
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Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T. (2000). Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00142

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