Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence and the same expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium, but differ in the incentive to play a best response rather than an inferior response.In each game, risk dominance conflicts with payoff dominance and selects an inefficient pure strategy equilibrium.We find statistically and economically significant evidence that the differences in the incentive to optimize help explain observed behavior.
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Algorithm exploitation: Humans are keen to exploit benevolent AI
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“Again, our first finding replicates known results (Battalio et al., 2001): when people interacted with humans, the majority of participants (86”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Battalio, R., Samuelson, L., & Van Huyck, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2001-05
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 749-764
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2149861319
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 45.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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